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I. INTRODUCTION

The national parliament of Iceland recently approved a very unusual
transaction: a $200 million sale to a private corporation of an exclusive
license to construct, manage, and commercially exploit a database that
will include health and genetic information on every resident of Iceland.'
This sale is a striking indicator of the extent to which courts, legislators,
researchers, and corporations are rapidly converting the common pool of
genetic resources into a restricted-access field of proprietary
entitlements. Recent developments in the legal, academic, and
industrial communities have challenged the formerly uncontroversial
assumption that genetic material, genetically modified organisms, and
basic-science research techniques constitute an open-access information

stock that falls outside the class of proprietary entitlements. Since the
1. The homogeneity of Iceland's population means that its genetic data are a
valuable prize for a biotechnology company. To address concerns about privacy and
informed consent, the sale agreement provides that any Icelander can request to be
excluded from the database. For a description of the transaction and responses in favor

of and in opposition to Iceland's decision, see R.C. Lewontin, People Are Not
Commodities, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1999, at A19 (opposing the commodification of the
human genome and lamenting the relaxed informed consent procedures regarding the
licensee's use of personal information); Simon Mawer, Iceland, the Nation of Clones,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1999, at A19 (questioning the public health utility of therapies
based on genetic research). For a more recent update on the grant of the license, see
Christopher Brown-Humes, Icelandic Gene Group Up Sharply, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
Jan. 25, 2000, at 29, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Financial Times (London).
2. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
following the International Biodiversity Convention, defines "genetic resources" as
"genetic materials of actual or potential value, containing functional units of heredity,
and of microbial, plant, animal, or other origin." ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND

GENETIC RESOURCES 12 (1996).

[VOL. 37: 987, 2000]

Cultivating the Genetic Commons
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

early 1980s, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), the
Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("Federal Circuit") have granted patent protection to a variety of
biotechnological innovations3 and research techniques that historically
have fallen outside the field of patentable products.
The explosive growth of the biotechnology industry and the
commercialization of some basic-science research in the past two
decades have coincided with, and may have relied closely upon, the
patentability of certain types of genetic material and certain research
techniques for genetic alteration.4 This recent trend toward parceling out
the genetic commons confronts policymakers with a novel variant of the
familiar tradeoff between enhanced productivity and reduced
accessibility that lies behind the extension of property rights to
collectively held resources Patent rights in genetic resources encourage
3. Several commentators in the patent and research and development ("R&D")
literature assign a special meaning to the term "innovation," tending to situate innovation
activities between more fundamental and less commercially oriented research
("invention") and less fundamental and more commercially oriented research
("development" or "modification"). This Article uses "innovation" in the popular sense
to encompass the full gamut of research and development activities designed to enhance
existing products, develop new products, or investigate general areas of scientific
inquiry. As needed, particular subsets of this general innovation category will be
specified. For a detailed discussion of the distinction between fundamental and
incremental types of innovation activities, see infra Part ITI.A.
4. The biotechnology industry covers a variety of technologies, including genetic
and biochemical applications, recombinant DNA, monoclonal antibody protection, and
tissue culture and cell fusion technologies. These techniques yield a wide range of
products, including pharmaceutical, medical therapeutic, medical diagnostic, and
agricultural products. This Article focuses on the pharmaceutical and medical product
markets, which constitute the largest share of the biotechnology market. For a technical
but accessible and up-to-date overview of biotechnological techniques and products, see
Fredric M. Steinberg & Jack Raso, Biotech Phannaceuticals and Biotherapy: An
Overview, 1 J. PHARMACEUTICAL Sci. 48 (1998). For a description of the major
biotechnological techniques from the perspective of patent law, see PHILIPPE G. DUCOR,
PATENTING THE RECOMBINANT PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND OTHER MOLECULES
35-69 (1998). For overviews of the biotechnology industry, see generally ROHNI
ACHARYA, THE EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: EXPERIENCES IN
INDUSTRIALISED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1999); GARY P. PISANO, THE
DEVELOPMENT FACTORY: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF PROCESS INNOVATION (1997);
STEVE PRENTIS, BIOTECHNOLOGY: A NEV INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1984).

5. The best articulation of this familiar dichotomy is found in Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AMER. ECON. REV. 347, 347-59 (1967). Under
Demsetz's well-known theory, property rights develop when the productivity gains from
allocating private entitlements (e.g., increased incentives to invest private labor and
capital) exceed the exclusion costs of preserving such entitlements (e.g., excluding
trespassers from private land, litigating title disputes, purchasing title insurance). See id.

private investors to sink funds into uncertain biopharmaceutical projects
that generate enormous development costs, take many years to yield a
marketable product, and are often vulnerable to relatively low-cost
imitators. There are some compelling and oft-voiced concerns, however,
that patent protection may be a cure that is worse than the disease.
Although patent rights may stimulate the commercial development of
biopharmaceutical therapies, many academic and industrial researchers
argue that these rights result in licensing, transaction, and litigation costs
that significantly restrict access to the research tools and materials
necessary for technological advance.6
This Article enters this debate and argues the following position.
Assuming that antitrust authorities persist in certain strategies to impede
patent consolidation, the recent introduction of patent rights for certain
biotechnological innovations is likely to encourage private investment in
the genetic commons and reduce (or, at least, not enhance) the
accessibility costs that could stunt technological advance. To reach this
conclusion, this Article shows that the two leading theories of patent
protection, the "incentive" theory7 and the "prospect" theory,8 do not
explain private industry's willingness to sink significant investment
capital into highly uncertain biopharmaceutical projects. These theories
offer insufficient explanations because patent protection for
biopharmaceutical innovations is substantially incomplete and generally
covers only a small portion of a particular innovation's technological
yield. Both the incentive and prospect theories falsely predict that the

appropriability

gap would

drive away private investors

from

biotechnology projects that appear to generate a large stream of
unprotected, or "giveaway," benefits. In contrast, this Article argues that
this imperfect form of patent protection attracts private investment in
uncertain research projects by reducing two information asymmetries
that impede interfirm ventures capable of efficiently spreading the high
risk of biopharmaceutical product development. At the same time, the
imperfect character of patent protection reduces (or, at least, does not
enhance) accessibility costs by encouraging individual firms to capture
the unprotected portion of an innovation project's expected yield by
entering into interfirm research, marketing, or production alliances.
at 350-53. If this is true, then any introduction of property rights necessarily involves a
tradeoff between increased productivity benefits and increased exclusion costs.
6. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
7. For a description of the incentive theory, see Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 839, 843

(1990).
8. See Edmund W.Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265,267-71 (1977).

990
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The incentive theory correctly states that patent protection stimulates
private investment by warding off low-cost imitators and promising
monopolistic profits that will at least cover product development costs.
But this account does not explain how patent protection could encourage
investors to divert funds from short-term, incremental innovation
projects to long-term, breakthrough innovation projects that generate
large inappropriable spillovers. The central thesis of this Article is that
patent protection can most effectively induce investment in highspillover innovations by providing incomplete coverage of the expected
knowledge giveaways. Imperfect patent rights, and the resulting
appropriability shortfall, may encourage patentholders to negotiate
interfirm alliances that spread the development costs and capture the
spillovers generated by fundamental research. This is not to say,
however, that patents are superfluous. Without patent protection,
potential research or production partners may face insurmountable costs
in revealing private information, committing credibly to nonopportunistic behavior, and locating attractive investment opportunities.
As a result, technological alliances do not go forward, and firms may
shift investments to low-spillover research projects that do not require
interfirm cooperation. By reducing the transaction costs of interfirm
collaboration, imperfect patent protection may have nurtured the
network structure? of the biotechnology market, which consists
principally of collaborative ventures assigning research tasks to small
biotechnology firms in the upstream market and distribution tasks to
large pharmaceutical firms in the downstream market.
But this story of innovation networks may not have a happy ending.

There is a reasonable chance that this network model will shift
toward a vertically integrated hierarchy'" that favors incremental
9. "Network structure" or "innovation network" refers to the variety of
collaborative relationships that small and large biotechnology or biopharmaceutical firms
enter into to develop biotechnology products. This Article contrasts this network form of
organization with a hierarchical or vertically integrated form of organization, where a
large entity performs all of the steps that are required to fully develop a marketable

product. This usage of the term generally follows that of the industrial economics
literature and the economics of organization literature, which characterize a network
form of organization as an agglomeration of loose relationships among small industrial
actors. See infranotes 59, 79-81 and accompanying text.
10. "Hierarchy" is used in Oliver Williamson's sense of an internally selfcontained or autarchic form of organization, which stands in contrast to market forms of
organization where small, autonomous actors engage in short-term, contractually
governed exchanges. See OLIvER E. WILLIAMsON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 20-40 (1975).

over fundamental product innovation. Although imperfect forms of
patent rights reduce some of the transaction costs of research

collaboration, the contrary would be true if dominant firms could perfect
effective patent coverage. This can be achieved by assembling broad
patent portfolios through successive corporate control and intellectual
property acquisitions. Biotechnological innovation may slow down as
innovating firms merge, patents on fundamental discoveries or research
techniques increasingly overlap, and a few industry participants acquire
sweeping patent portfolios. Concentrated patent holdings constitute
formidable entry barriers that may discourage a wide range of
subsequent improvers and other potential entrants. Absent significant
entry threats, incumbent firms may face serious disincentives to exploit
intensively these intellectual property holdings and sustain significant
levels of fundamental innovation. This is because dominant firms that
foresee few potential entrants either: (1) may be reluctant to introduce
pioneering innovations that would cannibalize existing product lines, or
(2) tend to suffer from bureaucratic hierarchies and agency-cost
distortions that stifle high-risk innovation projects.
Antitrust authorities may hold the key to foreclosing this unfortunate
scenario. Merger enforcement can play a crucial role in preserving the
disaggregated network structure of the biotechnology industry and this
market's resulting innovative vitality. This structural concern best
explains some of the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") recent
applications of the "innovation market" approach" to several
biopharmaceutical mergers. As presented by the Antitrust Division and
the FTC, the innovation market approach treats research and
development ("R&D") as a production output and assesses: (1) merged
firms' ability to restrain the quantity of R&D output, and (2) whether
that restraint on innovative output would have anticompetitive effects in
the downstream product market. 2 Contrary to both "pro" arguments that
this novel standard complements conventional merger analysis and
"con" arguments that it is redundant or mistakenly targets efficient

business combinations, 3 this Article contends that this approach

11. The Antitrust Division and the FTC have enunciated this approach most
explicitly in U.S. DEP'T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10-13 (1995) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY GUIDELINES]. For further illumination of this approach, see FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-

TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 11-22 (1996) [hereinafter COMPETITION POLICY REPORT].
This report is based on two months of public hearings held by the FTC in October and
November, 1995, to assess the economic effects of globalization and innovation. See id.

at 1.

12.
13.

supra note 11, § 3.2.3.
For a full discussion of the innovation market approach and both sides of the
See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES,
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addresses innovative inefficiencies 4 that classical market power analysis
is likely to overlook. Adapting antitrust concerns with consumer injury
to science-based markets, the FTC has targeted biopharmaceutical
mergers that are unlikely to result in supracompetitive pricing in the
downstream products market but are likely to result in a reduced
diversity and limited diffusion of technological inputs in the upstream
market. Science-based markets require that antitrust authorities examine
whether merging firms have the ability to injure the direction of R&D

outputs by adopting an innovation portfolio that favors low-risk
strategies of product improvement over high-risk strategies of
breakthrough innovation. Although these combinations may not lead
to allocative inefficiencies in the form of supracompetitive pricing,
unilateral output restraints, or even reduced R&D expenditures, they
may result in innovative inefficiencies in the form of a reduced
incidence of fundamental product innovation.
To neutralize this danger, antitrust authorities can adopt, and to a large
extent have adopted, a two-part regulatory strategy. First, antitrust
authorities generally apply relaxed standards to research joint ventures,
which facilitate information exchange among industry and academic
researchers, spread development costs among several participants, and
offer few plausible opportunities for cartel restraints on R&D or product
output. Second, antitrust authorities have begun to apply licensing and
divestiture remedies in approving mergers among dominant firms in the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. The transaction-cost
rationale for patent protection provides compelling grounds for this
compulsory licensing strategy. Incomplete patent coverage of expected
spillovers from basic-science innovation already encourages interfirm
collaboration to capture a greater portion of those unprotected spillovers.
debate, see Symposium, A CriticalAppraisal of the "Innovation Market" Approach, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1995). See also infra Part IV.C.1.
14. Innovative efficiency must be distinguished from allocative (and productive)
efficiency. A market is allocatively efficient when it prices inputs and outputs equal to
their marginal cost. If this is true, then the market must be allocating resources to the
buyers who value them most, as measured by willingness to pay or willingness to forego
other consumption alternatives. A market is innovatively efficient when it provides

incentives for the private sector to invest funds in technological development that
increases aggregate social wealth over the long term. For discussions of the distinction
between innovative and allocative (and productive) efficiency, see Joseph F. Brodley,

The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological

Progress,62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1032-34 (1987); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency,

and Progress,62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 998, 998-1002 (1987). See also infra Part IV.C.

If this is true, then the threat of licensing or divestiture may further
encourage interfirm alliances by further curtailing patent coverage and
inducing large downstream firms to obtain innovation inputs by
collaborating with, rather than acquiring, small upstream firms.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews governmental efforts
to promote private investment in the biotechnology sector through
federal funding of basic-science research and patent protection for
certain genetic innovations. Part III examines critically the incentive
and prospect rationales for patent protection and proposes a transactioncost rationale that supplies a stronger basis for extending patent rights to
the genetic commons. Part IV argues that dominant firms may
accumulate socially excessive patent portfolios and suggests that

antitrust authorities can maintain a wide diffusion of technological assets
through relaxed treatment of R&D joint ventures and compulsory
licensing remedies for certain biopharmaceutical mergers.
II. PAST AND PRESENT: CULTIVATING THE GENETIC COMMONS
Any discussion of patent policy in the biotechnology sector requires
some factual knowledge of the federal government's impressive efforts
to stimulate private investment in this innovation market. Historically
the federal government has allocated substantial resources to academic
research that has generated the informational stock forming the basis for
biotechnological development. Recently some governmental actors have
sought to enhance private investment incentives by assigning patent
protection to certain products or processes that researchers extract from
the pool of genetic resources. This Part describes the historical
development of each of these incentive-correcting policy devices.
A.

Assembling the Knowledge Base

Since World War II, the federal government has supplied basicscience research both directly, by maintaining government laboratories,
and indirectly, through research grants or procurement programs that
extend funds to universities, nonprofit research institutes, and private
industry.'5 In the biotechnology sector, the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") has played an especially important role as a financing source.' 6
15. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and PrivateDevelopment: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663,
1667 (1996). Currently, there are over 600 federal laboratories employing well over

100,000 scientists and engineers.

See ALAN S. GUTERMAN & JACOB N. ERLICH,

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER: THE TRANSACTIONAL AND LEGAL

ENVIRONMENT 2 (1997).
16. See Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A False Start? The
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Most recently, the federal government has been funding the three billion
dollar Human Genome Project.' 7 Federal funding reduces the start-up

cost of innovation projects in the biotechnology sector by supplying a
knowledge base that opens up a broad prospect of potential advances for
subsequent improvers. Government funding also provides training
experience for research personnel who later move to a commercial
environment. Much of the current growth in the biotechnology industry
relies on scientific knowledge garnered through academic research or
through industrial researchers who gained experience through federally
funded projects.'8
B.

ParcelingOut the Knowledge Base

In the biotechnology sector, Congress and the federal courts took two
significant steps that extended patent protection to basic-science
research.' 9 In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act,20 which gives

universities, small businesses, and nonprofit institutions the right to
patent inventions developed through federally funded research.' Also in
Impact of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE. J. ON REG. 163,
203-04 (1996) (stating that the NIH provides billions of dollars of research funding
annually and that "the NIH is to the genotech industry what NASA has been to the space
mission").
17. For a comprehensive description of this mammoth project, see the U.S. Dep't
of Energy website devoted to this topic at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Human
Genome Project Information (visited Sept. 11, 2000) <http:llwww.oml.govlhgmis/
project/ budget.html>.
18. See Walter W. Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the
Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcON. 197, 200 (1996)
(stating that university researchers commonly take their sabbaticals at biotech firms and
senior scientists move back and forth between universities and biotech firms); Gina A.
Kuhlman, Comment, Alliancesfor the Future: Cultivating a Cooperative Environment
for Biotech Success, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 319 (1996) (stating that alliances

between industry and universities, funded by federal grants, have facilitated capitalintensive and long-term biotechnological projects).
19. For a historical review of the federal government's policies toward granting
patent rights for government-funded research, see Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1663.
20. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-3028 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). The Bayh-Dole Act provides abundant
opportunities for research participants to obtain patents for federally funded innovations.
If a contractor fails to retain title to an invention within a certain period, the funding
agency may seek a patent; if neither the contractor nor the agency seeks a patent, then
the individual researcher may do so. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), (c)(2), (d). Several other
statutes encourage the transfer of technology from federally funded procurement
programs to the private sector. See, e.g., Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act

1980, the Supreme Court's ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty extended

patent protection to a genetically engineered microorganism which
would break down crude oil, on the grounds that the patentee had
significantly altered a naturally occurring organism.' As a result of the
Chakrabarty decision, the PTO now grants patents to innovators who

genetically modify a naturally occurring, non-human, multicellular

organism 4 or, in some cases, to innovators who isolate whole genes or
even gene fragments and sufficiently identify their biological function2,
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (1994)
(mandating that the federal government and its affiliated laboratories may transfer
technology to the private sector through a variety of methods, including disseminating
information about federal products and processes)); Federal Technology Transfer Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710-3714 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (giving federal agencies the authority to conduct cooperative research
with outside parties and negotiate patent licenses and chartering the Federal Laboratory
Consortium for Technology Transfer)).
22. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
23. See id. at 303, 310 (holding that the patentee had created a "new bacterium
with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature"). Federal law requires
that all patent applications show that the claimed innovation is "nonobvious," which
means that it constitutes a significant advance over previously discovered information
existing at the time that the invention was made, or alternatively, that it represents
something more than what would have been considered obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time the invention was made. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998). The Chakrabarty Court focused on the nonobviousness requirement and sought
to distinguish the case from previous decisions that had ruled that naturally occurring
products were obvious, and hence, not patentable subject matter. See Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). But see In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 97375 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding that a biologically pure bacterial culture is patentable

because the culture did not exist in nature in its pure form and could only be produced in
a laboratory under precisely controlled circumstances). For a full description of the
statutory patentability requirements, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
24.

See Nonnaturally OccurringNon-Human Animals Are Patentableunder § 101,

33 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 664, 664 (Apr. 23, 1987) (stating that
"non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals,
are patentable subject matter"). For an example of a patent protection issued under this
policy, see U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866, issued April 12, 1988, granting patent protection
to Harvard University for an "oncomouse," a mouse genetically engineered to be
unusually susceptible to cancer. See TransgenicNon-Human Mammals, United States

Patent No. 4,736,866 (Apr. 12, 1988), available in Delphion Intellectual Property
Network, US4736866: Transgenic Non-Human Mammals (visited Aug. 22, 2000)

<http://www.patents.ibm.com/details?&pn=US04736866__& s_all=l>. Even before the
Court's decision in Chakrabarty,two federal statutes had extended limited patent-like
protection to new plant organisms. The Plant Patent Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 376 (codified
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), extends patent protection to asexually
reproducing plant types. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577,
84 Stat. 1542 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1994)), directs the Department of
Agriculture to extend patent-like protection to "inventors" of sexually reproduced plant
types.
25. The extent to which a researcher must isolate a particular genetic sequence in
order to obtain patent protection has recently been the subject of much' controversy. In
1991, the NIH sought patents on complete gene sequences on the basis of scientific
documentation of partial gene sequences (expressed sequence tags or ESTs) whose
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In the gene therapy sector, most of the patents the PTO has granted are
process patents on "research tools" that contain techniques for genetic
alteration or for the delivery of altered genetic material to patients 6
During this same period, the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, generally
has adopted a patent-friendly stance that has resulted in more favorable
rulings for patent infringees, higher infringement damage awards, and
greater average patent scope.'
The Bayh-Dole Act and the Chakrabarty decision have sparked a
technology transfer industry that has enabled private industry to acquire
function NIH researchers had not yet ascertained. The PTO initially denied the
application on some of the claims because the NIH had not specified the function of the
claimed genetic sequence. The NIH later withdrew the remaining claims in the face of
public controversy from researchers and industry representatives. For a retelling and

analysis of the controversy, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective
on the NIH Gene Patenting Controversy, 55 U. Prrr.

L. REV. 633, 633-34 (1994).

Currently, the PTO occasionally grants patent protection to complete or even
fragmentary gene sequences provided the specifications are sufficiently narrow and the
patent application documents the sequence's function. Whether more extensive
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
protection will become available remains unclear.
Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale DNA
Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557, 563 (1996). Recently, the PTO has
released new proposed utility guidelines which, if adopted, would raise the patentability
threshold for patent applications on gene sequences. See Revised Interim Utility
Guidelines and Revised Interim Written Description Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71441
(1999). These interim guidelines require that applicants credibly show a specific
function or use to which the claimed gene sequence can be applied and, therefore, would
exclude gene sequences whose function could only be potentially revealed by extensive
additional research. See Gene Patents on Other Genomic Inventions: Oversight Hearing
Before the U.S. House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 106th Cong. 1
(July 13, 2000) (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson, Chairman, PTO) [hereinafter Gene
Patents]. See also Martin Enserink, Patent Office May Raise the Bar on Gene Claims,
287 Sci. 1196 (Feb. 18, 2000) (stating that the PTO has decided that "patent applicants
must demonstrate a more substantial, real-world utility; not some throwaway utility").
26. See John K. Flanagan, Gene Therapy and Patents, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'y 739, 739-40 (1998). The most well-known example of a patented research
tool in the biotechnology sector is the pair of Cohen-Boyer patents, U.S. Patents
4,237,224 and 4,468,464, issued in 1980 and 1984, respectively, which were licensed for
nominal fees on a nonexclusive basis by Stanford University throughout the term of the
patents. See Gene Patents, supra note 25, at 6. These patents cover some of the
fundamental techniques used in recombinant DNA research. See id.
27.

See JEAN

0. LANJOUV

& JOSH LERNER, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITrERATURE 8-9 (National Bureau of

Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6296, 1997).

See also SAMUEL KORTUM & JOSH

LERNER, STRONGER PROTECTION OR TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: WHAT Is BEHIND THE

RECENT SURGE INPATENTING? 8-9 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper

No. 6204, 1997) (stating that, from 1982 to 1990, the Federal Circuit affirmed 90% of
district court decisions holding patents to be valid and infringed, and reversed 28% of
judgments of invalidity and non-infringement).

licenses to the fruits of university research and encouraged academic

researchers to pursue commercial applications for some of their
scientific discoveries.2 This extension of patent rights has catalyzed the
biotechnology industry by opening up the federally funded genetic

commons to dispersed ownership and commercial exploitation by
academic institutions and large and small industry participants. Since

the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities have opened up
technology transfer departments, filed for a significantly higher number
of patents, and collaborated more frequently with private industry.29 In a
remarkable departure from academic norms that generally disdain

commercial entanglements, numerous researchers have curtailed or
abandoned their university-related endeavors and founded start-up firms
specializing in biomedical research."

These small scientist-founded

28. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1708 (noting that "the Bayh-Dole Act has
been consistently hailed as an unqualified success in stimulating the commercial
development of discoveries emerging from government-sponsored research in
universities"); Gale R. Peterson, Introduction to the Field of Biotechnology Law, in
UNDERSTANDING BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW: PROTECTION, LICENSING, AND INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY POLICIES 1, 5 (Gale R. Peterson ed., 1993) (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act
"was largely responsible for the expansion of existing [technology transfer] programs" at
many universities and nonprofit research institutions). See also Kenneth Sutherlin
Ducker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed
Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 461-66 (1997) (relying on

empirical data to show that patent law reforms, and changes in federal law that
encourage universities to obtain patents on federally funded research, have fueled the
rise of the biotechnology and biopharmaceutical industries); REBECCA HENDERSON ET
AL., UNIVERSITIES AS A SOURCE OF COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY: A DEfTAILED ANALYSIS
OF UNIVERSITY PATENTING 1965-1988, at 8-9 (National Bureau of Econ. Research

Working Paper No. 5068, 1995) (stating that university technology transfer offices
reported in 1992 that they received royalties totaling about $230 million on about 3000
patents).
29. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 1 (finding that number of university
patents increased 15-fold since 1965 while university spending on research income
increased only 300%); Kuhlman, supra note 18, at 345-46 (noting that universities were
awarded 1324 patents in 1991, an increase of 200% over the 437 granted in 1980). It is
true that technology transfer and patent licensing do not bring universities income that is
significant relative to the size of a large university's operating budget. See Lita Nelsen,
Identifying, Evaluating, and Reporting Innovative Research Developments at the

University,

in UNDERSTANDING BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW: PROTECTION, LICENSING, AND

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES 25, 28-29 (Gale R. Peterson ed., 1993) (stating that
"even a fully developed licensing program will yield royalty income no more than 2 to
5% (at most) of... [a university's] total annual research budget"). Nevertheless,
universities have strong incentives to attract industry sponsorship that provides
"unrestricted" funding (as opposed to dedicated federal funds) and insures against
volatile swings in the availability of federal funding. See id.
30. See Henry Etzkowitz, The Norms of EntpreneurialScience: Cognitive Effects
of the New University-Industry Linkages, 27 RES. POL'Y 823, 823-33 (1998) (noting that
universities are currently undergoing a shift toward a commercial ethos, where academic
scientists have repeated interactions with private industry); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patentsand the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Progress of Science] (noting that the
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biotechnology companies have played a crucial role in transferring
scientific research from universities to the commercial marketplace.3'
Together, Chakrabarty and the Bayh-Dole Act have instituted a patent
regime that has shifted significant portions of the academic knowledge
base to private firms that apply this knowledge to develop commercially
viable biopharmaceutical applications.

III. ACCESS EXPANDED: PATENT PROTECTION
AND INNOVATION NETWORKS

Discussions in the legal, industrial, and scientific communities on the

introduction of patent rights into the genetic commons often speak of an
intractable tradeoff between enhanced productivity and diminished
accessibility. 2 On the one hand, patent grants offer a monopoly reward
that encourages private investors to endure the high development costs
and long gestation period of basic biopharmaceutical research. The full

development of a biotechnology product usually takes more than a
decade,33 and development costs typically total over $200 million3 4 On
the other hand, any enhanced innovation incentives come at the price of
"biotechnology revolution has accelerated the commercial development of basic

research," blurred the distinction between basic and applied research, and led academic
scientists to patent commercially valuable research discoveries); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J.
177, 195-97 (1987) (suggesting that industrial sponsorship of biomedical research and
availability of patent protection have blurred the traditional distinction between basic and
applied research in this sector).
31. See ACHARYA, supra note 4, at 33.
32.

See Report of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on

33.

See Joshua Lerner, Venture Capitalistsand the Decision to Go Public, 35 J.

Research Tools (1998) (visited July 1, 2000) <http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools
index.htm> [hereinafter NIH Report]; COMPETITION POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, chs.
6 & 8; Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 30, at 1017. For an important
exception to this general tendency, see Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both
Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (1991). Ordover shows that, in the
Japanese patent system, legal constraints on available forms of patent protection induce
firms to internalize spillovers through cross-licensing and other forms of collaboration.
See id. at 44-54. On a more general level, Ordover uses the Japanese example to argue
that much policy discussion in the patent literature relies on overly crude dichotomies
between the exclusion/diffusion and short-term/long-term characteristics of patent
protection. See id.
FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1994).
34. See PISANO, supra note 4, at 73-74. As of 1993, published estimates report
that average "out of pocket" R&D costs for a new biotechnology-based drug are $125
million and average "facility" costs ("cash outlays on new plant and equipment required
to manufacture a new chemical entity") are $99 million. Id.

reduced access to certain genetic discoveries or research techniques that
cover a broad field of subsequent applications. Today academic and
industrial researchers commonly lament the ballooning costs of
navigating around proliferating clusters of patent claims,35 and some
commentators contend that patent claims ultimately will result in
upstream strangleholds on basic-research discoveries that will
significantly impede downstream technological applications.36
This Part offers a revised argument for granting patents to
biotechnological discoveries, suggesting that this cost-cost tradeoff is

not inevitable.

That is, policymakers

can purchase enhanced

appropriability for biotechnological innovators without paying any price
in the form of reduced accessibility. To show how this may be possible,

this Article reviews and casts some doubt on the well-known incentive
and prospect theories of patent protection.37 Incentive theories correctly
35.
See COMPETITION POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 5-6 (stating that
"especially with respect to new technologies such as biotechnology and computers, there
is concern that overbroad grants and enforcement of intellectual property rights may
increase incentives for anticompetitive conduct such as illegal patent pooling or sham
litigation"); NIH Report, supra note 32, at 5-16 (exploring the extension of patent rights
to "research tools" and noting that many scientists are frustrated about restricted access
to research techniques and believe that this is impeding technological advancement). See
also Jackie Hutter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the
Pharnaceuticaland Chemical Sciences and the Determinationof Conception in Patent

Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 687, 724-25 (1995) (noting that research joint ventures
rush to protect investment funds by patenting discoveries before commercial application
is clearly defined and, as a result, these patents are vulnerable to litigation).
36. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998)

(arguing that excessive patenting in genetic research can lead to an "anticommons"
where multiple property rights holdings impede the progress of unified research efforts).
For a strong response to these arguments, see John J. Doll, The Patentingof DNA, 280
Scr. 689 (1998). The author argues that fears that patent rights for gene sequences will
impede downstream technological advance simply repeat unfounded fears expressed 30
years earlier with respect to the granting of patent rights for the building blocks of basic
polymers (a key component of certain insulation products). See id. Just as some
commentators now argue that patent rights for DNA fragments will impede downstream
research that relies on applying those fragments to subsequent discoveries, commentators
once argued that patent rights for the building blocks of basic polymers would have a
similar adverse effect. See id. As it turns out, these fears did not materialize because the
Patent Office employed the patentability requirements to grant patent protection to
subsequent investors who invented similar copolymers of the same type. See id. at 68999. As the author suggests, the Patent Office has discretion to employ the same legal
tools to foster downstream research in the biotechnology industry. See id.
37. For a review of these (and other) standard theories of patent protection, see
Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 839-916. For current surveys of the vast literature on
the economics of innovation, see generally CHRIS FREEMAN & Luc SoETE, THE
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION (3d ed. 1997); RICHARD R. NELSON, THE
SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996); HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Paul Stoneham ed., 1995); THE HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION (Mark Dodgson & Roy Rothwell eds., 1994); F.M. SCHERER &
DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 613-60
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imply that, since biopharmaceutical innovations are high-cost projects
that are vulnerable to low-cost imitation, patent protection is required to
eliminate the free-rider threat that may prevent investors from recouping
development costs and capturing the knowledge spillovers of a
breakthrough invention. But this theory does not explain how, given a
wide distribution of low-risk/low-spillover and high-risk/high-spillover
innovation possibilities, patent rewards could encourage private
investment in the most fundamental and uncertain types of innovation
projects. Prospect theory recognizes this shortfall and prescribes
"mineral claim" patents, which cover all, or most, of an innovation's
technological yield, to induce investment in R&D projects that fall at the
high end of the risk/spillover spectrum.
Neither the incentive theory nor the prospect theory, however, leads to
correct policy conclusions in biotechnology or other heavily sciencebased industries. This is because broad patents are not required to
induce, and may even discourage, high-risk/high-spillover types of R&D
investment in these areas. Widespread collaborative behavior in the
biotechnology sector indicates that patent rights may function primarily
as a facilitator mechanism that reduces the transaction costs of
negotiating and sustaining interfirm R&D alliances. To play this role,
however, patents must offer no more than incomplete protection. That

enables investors to recoup development costs but does not cover the
expected spillovers of a completed innovation. Imperfect patent
coverage encourages patentholders to form technology-sharing alliances
that allow participating firms to internalize a large portion of the
expected spillovers by combining intellectual property holdings and
research, marketing, or distribution capabilities. These interfirm
ventures allow patent holders to minimize knowledge giveaways by
erecting barriers to second-mover imitators through enhanced patent
coverage and scale-efficient distribution and marketing facilities. By
bringing together potential biotechnology rivals, these industry-industry
or industry-university collaborations may reverse the tradeoff between

accessibility and productivity that commentators routinely attribute to
patent protection. Current technology-sharing practices in the
biotechnology industry suggest that this imperfect form of patent

protection has enhanced accessibility to and cultivation of the
government-funded base of biotechnological knowledge.
(3d ed. 1990).
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A.

Basic Research and the Underinvestment Problem

A firm contemplating an innovation project must assess the net
present value of the proposed R&D investment. To do so, it must
consider the extent to which it expects to: (1) recover projected
development costs and (2) appropriate the innovation's projected
revenues (including revenues derived from subsequent applications). If
patent protection is not available, the extent to which the firm can expect
to recover development costs depends on the post-invention costs of
production and marketing, expected consumer demand, and, crucially,
rivals' costs of imitating the innovation. Imagine that firm A, after
several years of expensive R&D, is the first to invent and produce a
nuclear-powered toothbrush and initially acquires a monopoly share in
the nuclear-powered toothbrush market. Firm B, however, may free-ride

on firm A's extensive development efforts, design a cheaper production
method or more attractive brand image at relatively little cost, and
diminish A's market share before A can recoup development costs.38 If
firm A expects to suffer this first-mover disadvantage, it may delay
investment and wait to exploit a second-mover opportunity. Thus,
potential innovators are caught in a waiting game and technological
advance slows as a result.
The incentive problems under a no-patent regime are not, however,
completely insuperable. If first-movers can erect imitation barriers
through technological opacity, trade secrecy, brand image, distribution
efficiencies, or network effects, then there may be a second-mover
penalty, and the waiting game may preclude only a portion of innovative
output. 9 But these non-patent imitation barriers only partially solve the
underinvestment problem. Even if non-patent imitation barriers are
effective and firm A believes it can recoup development costs (plus a
reasonable return) before imitative products erode its market share, it
may not develop the nuclear-powered toothbrush if this breakthrough
38. An empirical study of imitation costs finds that, although there is considerable
interindustry variation, imitation costs are generally significantly lower than innovation
costs. See Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents:An Empirical Study, 91

ECON. J. 907, 909-10 (1981) (reporting that the ratio of imitation costs to innovation
costs is 0.65, and the ratio of imitation time to innovation time is 0.70).
39. The non-patent-based first-mover advantage is most pronounced for network
technologies where each consumer who has already purchased the technology
experiences increasing returns as more consumers adopt the technology. Thus, where
two substitute and novel technologies are competing to garner consumer loyalty, the first
technology to enter the market may enjoy an unbeatable lock-in effect, since even a
superior but latecomer technology may not induce consumers to incur the switching
costs of abandoning the old but inferior technology. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing
Technologies, hcreasingReturns, and Lock-In by HistoricalEvents, 99 ECON. J. 116,

116-17 (1989).
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innovation may open up other innovation possibilities to competitors. If
these innovation possibilities include technological advances that could
render firm A's well-established product line of electric toothbrushes
obsolete, it may have little incentive to introduce the nuclear-powered
toothbrush. Even if the nuclear-powered toothbrush is difficult to
imitate perfectly, and thus, the firm can maintain its monopoly share in
the product market, this innovation may indicate design principles for
which the firm cannot charge a user's fee in the innovation market.
Thus, the firm earns a short-term return on its toothbrush but gives away
the design principle for all nuclear-powered handheld appliances. For
this reason, firm A may prefer to develop an electric toothbrush with
kiwi-flavored toothpaste that introduces marginal improvements to
existing technologies and has little spillover value for subsequent
improvers.
As this simplified example indicates, a no-patent world is bad public
policy primarily because competing firms may fall to generate a socially
adequate direction, rather than rate, of innovative output. This result has
a sound theoretical explanation: the more fundamental the type of
innovation, the more closely it resembles a public good that an
unregulated market tends to produce in socially inadequate quantities. 0
A public good exhibits two characteristics: (1) it is impossible (or
extremely costly) to exclude other people from using that good (the nonexclusivity condition), and (2) each additional user of that good does
nothing (or very little) to diminish the value of that good (the nonrivalrousness condition).4'
Whether or not biopharmaceutical innovations usually satisfy
substantially the nonrivalrousness condition is disputable, since any
particular scientific discovery opens up a broad but finite prospect42 of
commercially marketable applications. Thus, each additional researcher
who improves upon an initial innovation reduces the limited therapeutic
yield that remains for subsequent improvers to extract.
Biopharmaceutical innovations, however, largely satisfy the nonexclusivity condition, since these are informational goods that third
40.

On the concept of public goods (and related concepts), see generally RICHARD

CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALTIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB

GOODS (2d ed. 1996).

41.
42.

See id.
"Prospect" refers to the potential applications and innovations that subsequent

improvers may develop on the basis of an initial, more fundamental innovation. See
Kitch, supra note 8, at 266.
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parties may be able to imitate at low cost. The high costs of excluding
imitators may prevent the innovator from earning a reasonable return or
even recouping development costs. Even if imitation costs are high
enough that the innovator can expect to recoup development costs, there
may be few barriers to subsequent improvers and, thus, the first-mover
innovator gives away research methods or design principles that it
cannot internalize as profitable return.
In the absence of some form of state intervention, the market is likely
to underinvest in fundamental innovation projects that generate a large
stream of inappropriable spillovers. High-appropriability, low-spillover
activities include intermediate and advanced product development, such
as quality-enhancing modifications to existing products, cost-reducing
modifications to existing processes of production, and cost-neutral
modifications that enhance product differentiation and brand image."
Low-appropriability, high-spillover activities include radical product and
process innovations that derive from basic research and some forms of
applied research." Without patent protection, private investors are likely
to bias their R&D portfolios toward incremental
4 5 improvements and
away from more basic and applied research efforts
Even if exclusion costs are low enough to allow first-mover
innovators to realize significant profits by moving ahead on the learning
curve, cultivating a brand image, and establishing a dominant market
share, innovators still may have strong incentives to pursue small, rather
than breakthrough, inventions. This is because less fundamental types
of product research are more likely to yield a technically feasible and
commercially marketable product. Furthermore, they are less likely to
generate knowledge spillovers that benefit competitors. Even if the lure
of a first-mover advantage leads some innovators to pursue breakthrough
inventions, subsequent improvements are likely to proceed slowly since
the initial innovator minimizes spillover losses by concealing the
knowledge that lies behind the breakthrough invention. Reinventing the
43. See FREEMAN & SOETE, supra note 37, at 242-85.
44. See id. Basic research is roughly what goes on in most university and
government laboratories; it expands the common stock of scientific knowledge, but does
not point toward any practical application in a reasonable time horizon. See SCHERER &
Ross, supra note 37, at 616. Applied research covers much of what takes place in
industry laboratories or, more recently, in collaborative ventures between private firms
and university departments. See id. at 619.
45. There is a consensus among economists that, absent state intervention, private
expenditures on basic research are likely to take place at socially suboptimal levels. See
FREEMAN & SOETE, supra note 37, at 268-72. This consensus derives from two classic
papers. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
hIvention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962); Richard R. Nelson,

The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1959).
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wheel every so often is not the best path toward technological
advancement.
B.

The Incomplete Argumentfor Patent Protection

This hypothetical no-patent world illustrates the basic lesson of the
incentive theory. Namely, patent awards encourage innovation by
supplying a rational profit motive to invest privately held resources in
uncertain R&D projects. Since certain intellectual assets are often
vulnerable to low-cost imitation, many innovations would not take place
without patent rights that mitigate the first-mover penalty by promising
monopoly profits for some limited duration. Patent duration must be
carefully constrained, however, because a monopoly grant results in two
significant social costs: (1) distributive costs (consumer surplus is
transferred to the patent holder through supracompetitive pricing), and
(2) allocative costs (deadweight loss results because monopoly power

leads to output distortions)."

Although deadweight loss tends to

constitute a small portion of a monopolist's total sales, it can lead to
more significant efficiency losses. This is because monopoly shares
may: (1) encourage dominant-firm managers to allow costs to rise
significantly above competitive levels (thus wasting social resources), or
(2) induce firms to incur rent-seeking expenses to acquire or preserve
monopoly shares (thus dissipating monopoly profits).47 To minimize
these indirect, and possibly very significant, allocative costs of
monopoly shares, incentive theories usually hold that patent grants
should generate profits that, ideally, cover no more than the innovator's
expected development expenses plus a reasonable rate of return. These
social costs of monopoly grants are worth incurring because either (1)
distributive costs do not alter aggregate wealth, and thus are irrelevant
for efficiency purposes, or (2) the direct and indirect allocative costs are
less than the opportunity cost of not having the innovation at all.
In contrast to most other industries, where there is weak empirical43
support for incentive-based efficiency arguments for patent protection,
46.

For a fuller discussion of the social costs of monopoly, see WALTER E.
298-305 (7th ed.

NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION

1997).
47. See Scherer, supra note 14, at 998-1000.
48. Several empirical studies cast some doubt on incentive-based arguments for
patent grants by showing that firm managers in most industry sectors believe they can
raise imitation costs significantly through non-patent devices such as brand image, trade
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pharmaceutical firm managers report that they would not undertake most

innovation projects if patent protection were not available.49
Notwithstanding this finding, however, an incentive theory of patent

protection does not satisfactorily explain R&D behavior in the
biopharmaceutical industry. The reason is straightforward: although an
incentive theory explains how patents may encourage biopharmaceutical
firms to invest in innovation projects generally, it does not explain how
patents could encourage these firms to select high-risk/high-spillover

projects in particular. Even if patent protection enables firms to recoup
product development costs, it does not correct firms' rational tendency
to bias their R&D portfolio toward incremental research that generates
low knowledge spillovers. Even if patent protection is available,
investors are likely to gravitate toward short-term, low-risk projects that
secrecy, and "learning by doing." See WESLEY M. COHEN Er AL., PROTECTING THEIR
INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING
FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552,
2000) (surveying in 1994 R&D lab managers randomly drawn from a sample of all R&D
labs located in the U.S. conducting R&D as part of a manufacturing firm, receiving
responses from 1478 labs, and finding that most industries viewed patents as the least
effective mechanism for directly appropriating the economic returns from an investor);

Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, in 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTIvITY: SPECIAL ISSUE ON
MICROECONOMICS 783, 783-88 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1987)
(surveying manager expectations and showing that managers often view patents as
ineffective mechanisms to protect intellectual property from imitators, and that managers
use alternative devices to appropriate returns from R&D); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986) (surveying R&D executives
of 100 randomly chosen U.S. firms from 12 industries and finding that, in all industries
other than chemicals and pharmaceuticals, corporate managers believed that less than
30% of the inventions their firms developed during 1981 to 1983 would not have been
developed without patent protection).
49. See Levin et al., supra note 48, at 796-97. See also Mansfield, supra note 48,
at 175 (finding that pharmaceutical firms' managers believed that 60% of all new
products during 1981 to 1983 would not have been developed without patent protection).
This result is not surprising because pharmaceutical products are expensive to develop
but inexpensive to imitate perfectly, and thus few nonpatent devices can erect an
adequate imitation barrier. See Mansfield et al., supra note 38, at 913 (assessing the
imitation costs of copying patented and nonpatented innovation relative to the original
invention costs and finding that the ratio of imitation costs to invention costs is
especially skewed in the pharmaceutical industry where investors must incur enormous
development costs but most products can be imitated at fairly low cost). It is important
to add that the Food & Drug Administration ("FDA") approval process considerably
enhances the first-mover disadvantage for pharmaceutical firms since this lengthy
process doubles development costs for the initial innovator (and, under recent legislation,
generally does not apply to generic drugs). See Malinowski & O'Rourke, supra note 16,
at 205-10. Although 1984 federal legislation relieves generic drug manufacturers from
undergoing a full approval process, this legislation also amended the patent law to allow
drug manufacturers to request patent term extensions up to seven years to make up for
the delay caused by the FDA approval process. See Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 156, 355 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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have a lower potential return but a higher certainty of cost and profit
realization."0 Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that most large
firms employ incremental R&D strategies that rely on product
modification to maintain brand image, sustain market share, and ensure
readiness to react to technological innovations by existing or potential
competitors."1 This conventional investment pattern would impede
significant progress in the biopharmaceutical sector, because biomedical
innovation characteristically consists of a large portion of basic research
that is highly capital-intensive and tends to generate numerous spillover
applications.
Edmund Kitch sets forth a proposal that explains how a patent system
might correct this selection bias. Kitch argues that policymakers should
define patents in broad, property-like terms, so that patent claims extend
over a wide prospect of subsequent applications and encourage first-

mover inventors to exploit a wide range of possible improvements."2 As
Kitch suggests by analogizing patents to mineral claims, 3 this
"prospect" patent is effectively a form of perfect or complete patent
protection that covers development costs and many, or even most, of the
expected spillovers. Most economists and academic lawyers have
expressed serious doubt as to whether this policy recommendation
would result in net social benefits m It is easy to see why commentators
might reach this conclusion. Broadly defined patents appear likely to
exacerbate considerably the accessibility costs that attend any system
of property rights. Extending any form of patent protection to
biotechnological innovations obviously increases development costs for
subsequent researchers and, depending on patent scope and duration,
may reduce or eliminate some researchers' incentives to improve upon
existing innovations. This danger grows as patent size increases. If
50. See FREEMAN & SOETE, supra note 37, at 263-64 (stating that an unregulated
market will tend toward underinvestment in long-term R&D projects and overinvestment
in short-term R&D projects aimed at product differentiation).
51. Seeid. at255.
52. See Kitch, supranote 8, at 267-71.
53. See id. at 271-75.
54. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1044-51 (1997) (arguing that Kitch's proposal would

probably retard subsequent innovation because of high licensing costs, including
identifying suitable licensees and negotiating licensing terms); Merges & Nelson, supra
note 7, at 843-44 (criticizing Kitch's proposal and arguing that pioneering patents should
be limited in scope so as to encourage potential innovators to compete for patents on
improvements of the initial innovation).
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broad patents sufficiently inflate subsequent improvers' accessibility
costs, patent protection would fail a net social benefit test, since it would
reduce the total stream of innovative output that would exist in a world

without any patent protection.
There is little determinative empirical evidence to settle theoretical
speculation over the optimal scope and duration of patent protection. 5

Intuition, however, points strongly against Kitch in the biotechnology
sector, since an innovator would require a very broad definition of patent
rights to internalize the entire set, or even a substantial portion of the set,

of innovation possibilities generated by certain research techniques. If
this is true, then current patent coverage is substantially incomplete.

Current forms of patent protection for biotechnology innovations cover
only a small portion of the foreseeable prospect of subsequent
applications and courts often use various doctrinal instruments to narrow
further the scope of patent claims. 6 Under Kitch's theory, we would

expect few firms to invest in high-spillover innovations under this
relatively meager level of patent protection. But the real world operates
to the contrary. In spite of (or rather, as we shall soon see, because of)
these insufficient forms of patent protection, private industry has
invested heavily in fundamental biotechnology research. This result
suggests that private industry must be employing non-patent devices to
internalize some of the knowledge spillovers that these imperfect patents
55. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 868-70 (stating that most economic
models of patent scope and duration focus on the relation between breadth, duration, and
incentives to innovate, without giving serious consideration to the social costs of greater
duration and breadth in the form of retarded subsequent improvement); Donald J.
Wright, Optimal PatentBreadth and Length with Costly Imitation, 17 INT'L. J. INDUS.
ORG. 419, 426-32 (1999) (noting that policy recommendations as to patent breadth or
length depend on controversial assumptions as to market structure, the number of actual
or potential entrants, and the costs of imitation).
56. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 840-42 (stating that the PTO and the
courts generally have resisted granting broad prospects to biotechnological innovations
and that courts have considerable discretion in patent infringement litigation to narrow
the scope of a patent to enable subsequent improvements to go forward). But see
COMPETITION POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, ch. 8, at 13 (noting that "the scope of
patents issued has become increasingly broad, with some patent claims apparently
designed to cover an entire area of research or even basic research, particularly in the
biotechnology industry"). For an instance where a court has narrowed the scope of a
biotechnology patent, see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559

(Fed. Cir. 1997). In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit examined a patent for a method of
producing human insulin through a recombinant DNA process. See id. at 1562.
Although the patent claimed that the method could be applied to the isolation of the
insulin gene from higher mammals generally (including humans), it only specified the
nucleotide sequence for rats. See id. The court held that the enablement doctrine, and
the related requirement of a minimally specific description, narrowed the patent's scope
to the isolation of the insulin gene from rats. See id. at 1567-69. For a critical discussion

of this decision, see Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement
Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 209, 217-26 (1998).
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do not cover. As will be shown, the currently incomplete forms of
intellectual property coverage have led the biotechnology industry to
construct network forms of organization that make up for the
appropriability shortfall.
C. Completing the Argumentfor Incomplete PatentProtection
This Section presents the following claim. For the purposes of
determining the socially optimal level of patent coverage for
biotechnological innovations, it would not matter if empirical studies
could show that broad patents would pass a social cost-benefit test by
generating productivity benefits that would exceed accessibility costs.
This is because imperfect patents, covering no more than development
costs, adequately encourage firms to conduct basic research and improve
accessibility to that research. Relative to a regime of perfect patents, a
regime of imperfect patents does at least as well, and in fact probably
better, at encouraging basic research and does far better at sustaining
accessibility to the genetic commons. This insight carries an important
implication. Contrary to common assumptions, extending patent rights
to the genetic commons does not necessarily trigger a tradeoff between

productivity benefits and accessibility costs.
To demonstrate this point, this Section will complete the argument for
introducing patent rights into the biotechnology sector. As has already
been shown, the incentive theory can explain how patents induce a
certain rate, but not a certain direction, of innovative output. Incentive
theory can explain how patents encourage firms to innovate generally,
but it cannot explain how patents might encourage firms to select the
most fundamental and uncertain types of innovation projects. This
Section shows that imperfect patent rights can close the appropriability
gap between low-spillover and high-spillover R&D investments by
supplying a contracting device that reduces two important transaction
costs of interfirm collaboration.57 These transaction costs, each of which
57. For an argument that insecure, divided entitlements may sometimes facilitate
efficient bargaining more effectively than secure, undivided entitlements, see Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). The authors argue that undivided property
rights sometimes inhibit efficient bargaining outcomes by allowing private parties to act
strategically by concealing private information. See id. at 1058-61. By contrast,
uncertainty as to which party owns a particular entitlement (effectively resulting in a
divided entitlement in the context of negotiation) may induce parties to act cooperatively
by revealing private valuations of the contested item. For the ensuing debate, see Ian
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corresponds to a particular informational asymmetry, include: (1)
downstream firms', or buyers', costs of credibly committing to non-

opportunistic behavior, and (2) upstream firms', or sellers', costs of
credibly representing the value of intellectual assets. This transactioncost analysis detours around the tradeoff between productivity and

accessibility by showing that an imperfect form of patent protection
enhances productivity and accessibility by facilitating collaborative
networks that close the appropriability shortfall and disseminate the
genetic information stock among a wide community of competent users.
As shall be shown, the real world appears to confirm this theory. The
introduction of patent rights into the genetic commons has facilitated a
trading and licensing network that has substantially accelerated the
dissemination of the genetic knowledge stock and, as a result, the pace
of technological advance.
1.

The Virtues of Incomplete PatentProtection

Since the judicial and statutory initiation of patent rights for basic
research findings in 1980, biotechnological product development
generally has taken place through collaborative networks that involve

multiple research agents and industry participants. These alliances
typically match up a small biotechnology firm, which primarily attends
to basic research and early product development, and a large

pharmaceutical firm, which primarily attends to clinical testing,

marketing, and distribution.58 In contrast to classical models of autarchic
innovation, such as the corporate R&D department or the individual

inventor, the biotechnology sector relies on a network form of
organization that brings together the technological capabilities of several
firms and institutions.59 This network innovation structure reduces the

Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual

Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven

Shavell, Comment, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining?A Reply to Ayres and

Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995).
58. See infra Parts IHI.C.l.b.i & ii.
59. See FREEMAN & SO=T, supra note 37, at 225 (discussing historical models of
product innovation and reviewing the rise of the networking model in the late twentieth
century); P.R. Beije & J. Groenewegen, A Network Analysis of Markets, 26 J. ECON.
IssuEs 87, 87-88 (1992) (stating that a network analysis focuses on the complex
interdependencies between firms and, unlike conventional market analysis, does not
assume the perfect independence of firms); Paul L. Robertson & Richard N. Langlois,
hInovation, Networks, and Vertical Integration, 24 REs. POL'Y 543, 549-50 (1995)

(describing the "innovative network" and, specifically, the information exchange and
task specialization that exist among start-ups and venture capitalist firms in Silicon
Valley in California and Route 128 in Massachusetts). For more general discussions of
the relation between innovation and relatively hierarchical or non-hierarchical forms of

organization, see Mark Dodgson, Technological Collaborationand Innovation, in THE

1010

[VOL. 37: 987,2000]

Cultivating the Genetic Commons
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

funds that each participant risks and enables each participant to capture a
greater portion of the spillovers that result from radical product
innovation. These multiple-agent, disaggregated organizations replicate
much of the appropriability advantages of a hierarchical, large-fim
organization without exhibiting the same degree of resource
integration and bureaucratic inflexibility. Because patent awards for
biotechnological innovations generally cover only part of each
innovation's spillover applications, and sometimes only part of the
development costs, biotechnology innovators may have strong
incentives to enter into collaborative ventures that pool the development
costs and capture the spillover applications of a fundamental research
project.
This argument raises the obvious question of why, prior to 1980,
industry and academic actors did not enter into collaborative ventures in
the absence of patent protection. If research agents and industrial actors
can appropriate most of the rents generated by a particular innovation
through the nonpatent device of a collaborative alliance, why did these
research joint ventures only emerge on a significant scale after the

introduction of patent protection? Patent rights certainly appear to play
some role in encouraging biotechnological innovation, since empirical
surveys find that biopharmaceutical firms highly value patent protection
and, in its absence, probably would not undertake most R&D projects. 60

To resolve this puzzle, a transaction-cost rationale is offered for
extending patent rights to the biotechnology sector. Patent rights for
biotechnological innovations primarily serve as a means of reducing
commitment costs that potential contractual partners incur in negotiating
the terms of cooperative research or production ventures. By reducing
the informational asymmetries between biotechnology start-ups and
pharmaceutical multinationals, patent rights have facilitated the
widespread formation of strategic alliances between the upstream and
downstream sectors of the biopharmaceutical industry. At the same
time, the imperfect coverage of currently available patent entitlements
strongly encourages firms to execute innovation projects through
technology-sharing structures that reduce the stream of knowledge
giveaways. As shall be seen, these cooperative alliances offer upstream
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 285-92 (Mark Dodgson & Roy Rothwell eds.,
1994); Gerard Fairtlough, Innovation and Organization, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 325-35 (Mark Dodgson & Roy Rothwell eds., 1994).
60. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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and downstream firms a highly efficient mechanism for distributing the
technical and market uncertainties of fundamental innovation projects
and have become the preeminent mechanism for product development
and distribution in the biotechnology sector.
a. PatentRights as Commitment Devices
In a world without patent rights, upstream innovators may seek to
erect a nonpatent imitation barrier and internalize knowledge spillovers
by entering into technology-sharing alliances with downstream buyers
that offer scale-efficient distribution and clinical testing capacities. But
both upstream sellers and downstream buyers of R&D inputs face
commitment difficulties that may frustrate the realization of any
cooperative venture. This Section shows that patent entitlements, even
in their currently incomplete form, may offer a partial solution to this
commitment dilemma and thus cultivate the formation of interfirm
innovation structures.
i

Buyers' Commitment Costs

As a potential participant in a product development venture with a
large pharmaceutical firm, a biotechnology start-up has limited
information as to whether its downstream partner will behave
opportunistically during the course of their proposed collaboration. This
threat of midstream opportunistic behavior characterizes almost any
long-term relational agreement where it is too costly to: (1) write ex ante
a complete contract that covers all possible contingencies, (2) monitor in
midstream whether parties' performance is satisfactory, and (3) prove ex
post the damages from parties' inadequate performance.6 ' These
transaction costs mean that potential partners in a long-term alliance may

not be able to rely solely on even the most carefully drafted contractual
obligations-and judicial enforcement of those obligations-to deter
midstream opportunism. This dilemma may be especially severe in
technological alliances where the researcher, or start-up, often has a
single valuable intellectual asset62 and the large firm has either a welldiversified R&D portfolio or may be contributing to production and
marketing competencies rather than R&D assets in the joint project. 6
61. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,67
VA. L. RaV. 1089, 1092-93 (1981) (stating that ongoing, interactive relationships are
characterized by incomplete contractual agreements due to parties' inability to identify
all possible contingencies at the outset or adequately design complex adaptations even if
any contingencies are identifiable).
62. See ACHARYA, supra note 4, at 21.
63.
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Because the large firm invests far fewer transaction-specific,
nonsalvageable assets in the joint innovation project, it incurs a far
smaller loss if the project fails or if either party decides to abandon the
project. If an upstream start-up firm fears that its downstream partner
might reduce its financial commitment to the project, abandon the
project, or even duplicate the start-up's only significant intellectual asset
without reasonable compensation, it may be reluctant to reveal private

information to any potential large-firm partners. 4
Patent rights may mitigate this commitment problem by attaching a
severe legal penalty that opportunistic firms will have to pay for
improper conversion of intellectual assets. Although the high cost of
infringement litigation certainly constrains patent rights' effectiveness in
neutralizing midstream opportunism, these property-like entitlements
may alleviate a litigant's burden of showing that it is the source of an
improperly converted intellectual asset. Provided that patent rights
increase a large firm's expected costs of opportunistic behavior to a level
that equals or exceeds the expected benefits of such behavior, patent
rights may encourage upstream researchers to reveal valuable
intellectual assets to potential downstream partners. Even if patent
rights do not entirely solve large firms' commitment problem, these
firms can make up the difference by employing nonpatent devices-an
equity stake in the joint project or a long-term reputation as a
nonopportunistic partner-that expose them to further predetermined
losses if they act opportunistically.6 Together with these nonpatent
StrategicAlliances: A Transaction Cost Approach, 13 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 387, 388-89
(1997) (stating that "appropriability hazards" which derive from the difficulty of
specifying payoff-relevant activities, monitoring the execution of prescribed activities,
and enforcing contracts in court, are a "well-accepted characteristic of technology
contracts").
64. See generally Kitch, supra note 8, at 277-78 (noting that, absent patent rights,
innovators may not be able to seek business partners since "[d]isclosure of the secret
imperils its value, yet the outsider cannot negotiate until he knows what the secret is").
This is related to a point made by Kenneth Arrow, who observed that the holder of a
valuable piece of information will lose his monopoly on that information to the first
purchaser, since that purchaser can reproduce the information at little cost. See Arrow,
supra note 45, at 615.
65. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 61, at 1093 (stating that partners in relational
contracts might rely on bonding or monitoring arrangements to overcome the
deficiencies of uncertain contractual enforcement). See also Oxley, supra note 63, at
406 (stating that firms participating in cooperative R&D alliances may overcome the
threat of opportunistic behavior by taking equity stakes or exchanging valuable assets as
"hostages"); Gary P. Pisano, Using Equity Participationto Support Exchange: Evidence
from the Biotechnology Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 109, 111-12 (1989) (suggesting
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bonding devices, the threat of judicial damage awards for patent
infringement may enable large firms to commit credibly to

nonopportunistic behavior.
ii. Sellers' Commitment Costs
While the upstream start-up may have little credible information about
the large firm's opportunistic inclinations, the large firm may have little
credible information about the commercial and scientific value of the
researcher's intellectual assets. Thus, there is a commitment problem on
the seller's side. If the upstream fin cannot commit credibly to the
commercial value of its intellectual assets, then the downstream firm

may incur unsustainable costs in ascertaining high-quality sellers with
whom to enter into a collaborative relationship. These informational
asymmetries may create a pooling equilibrium where low-quality
researchers can imitate, at a low cost, the impressive claims of highquality researchers.
Patent rights can mitigate this signaling problem by erecting two
obstacles that low-quality sellers may not be able to overcome. First, the
patent examiners require that applicants demonstrate that their

innovation meets a certain specificity threshold ("utility" requirement),6

does not repeat "prior art" ("novelty" requirement)," and represents a
significant technical advance ("nonobviousness" requirement).69
Second, the patent courts attach a heavy legal penalty to the

nonconsensual imitation of properly patented intellectual assets. If lowthat some biotechnology firms may welcome the fact that large pharmaceutical firms
purchase an equity stake because this aligns the two firms' incentives and mitigates the
possibility that the large firm may abandon the project in midstream).
66. See GurERMAN & EHRLICH, supra note 15, at 70 (stating that "[s]electing
appropriate partners for licensing agreements or technology-based joint ventures is one
of the toughest problems for technology managers at research laboratories, universities,
and private firms"). See also David J. Teece, Firm Organization, IndustrialStructure,
and TechnologicalInnovation, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193, 199 (1996) (stating that
"[i]nvestors have obvious problems in evaluating the prospects for new products and
processes, and the best investees have problems, though less serious, in identifying the
best investors").
67. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This requires that the applicant show that the
invention presently offers a specific and concrete practical application (as opposed to a
mere principle or concept that lacks any direct and immediate technological
embodiment). See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1996).
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). This requires that the applicant show that the
invention does not replicate any "prior art"--i.e., that the invention was not known or

used by others prior to the invention by the applicant. See id.

69. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This requires that the applicant

show that the invention is not "obvious" and constitutes a significant advance over
previously discovered information existing at the time that the invention was made. See
id.
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quality input suppliers cannot meet the patent examiners' requirements,
or cannot sustain the litigation penalty for patent infringers, then patent
rights may allow high-quality sellers to send a credible signal that they
possess reasonably defensible legal title to a novel and well-developed
innovation product.
b. Innovation Networks as Risk-DistributionMechanisms
If patent rights reduce buyers' and sellers' credible commitment costs,
it is plausible to believe that they may have facilitated the cooperative
structures between university researchers, upstream start-ups, and

downstream manufacturers that constitute the primary vehicle for
biopharmaceutical product development. These collaborative ventures
cover a range of innovation structures including research sponsorship
agreements between universities and large firms' in-house R&D

departments, cross-licensing agreements between holders of blocking
patents or complementary technologies, manufacturing agreements,
marketing agreements, and, most notably, "strategic alliances" 0 between
small biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical firms.7'

The

70. A strategic alliance may be defined as "any arrangement in which two or more
firms combine resources outside of the market in order to accomplish a particular task or
set of tasks." SHARON M. OSTER, MODERN COMPETITVE ANALYSIs 229 (2d ed. 1994).
See also David Lei et al., Building Cooperative Advantage: Managing Strategic
Alliances to Promote OrganizationalLearning, 32 J. WORLD Bus. 203, 203 (1997)
(stating that "all strategic alliances may be thought of as coalignments between two or

more firms in which the partners seek to learn and acquire from each other products,
skills, technologies, and knowledge that are not available to other competitors"). For
general explorations of strategic alliances from the management literature, see generally
JOSEPH L. BADARACCO, JR., THE KNOWLEDGE LINK: How FIRMS COMPETE THROUGH
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES (1991); PETER LORANGE & JOHAN Roos, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES:
FORMATION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EVOLUTION (1992).

71. For a general discussion of these strategic alliances and research joint ventures
in the biotechnology industry, see generally Dueker, supra note 28; Eisenberg, supra
note 15; Kuhlman, supra note 18. For a detailed case study of the negotiation and
evolution of a typical strategic alliance in the biopharmaceutical industry, see LORANGE
& Roos, supra note 70, at 124-47. For empirical studies of strategic alliances and other
forms of interfirm R&D cooperation, see Srinivasan Balakrishnan & Mitchell P. Koza,
Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection and Joint-Ventures: Theory and Evidence, 20
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 99, 99-117 (1993) (examining investor reaction to

announcements of joint ventures between public companies during 1974-1977 and
finding that shareholders of parent companies enjoyed significantly larger abnormal

returns when the parents were engaged in dissimilar businesses, and concluding that a
joint venture is a mechanism for achieving synergistic gains by pooling complementary
assets); John Hagedoorn, Understanding the Rationale of Strategic Technology
Partnering:InterorganizationalModes of Cooperation and Sectoral Differences, 14
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international downstream market for biopharmaceutical products has
been tending toward increasing concentration and now consists of about

twenty major firms that have global capacities for distribution,

marketing, and manufacture.72 Some of the largest companies currently

have more than twenty collaborative projects ongoing with small
biotechnology firms 73 and alliances with downstream firms have become

the largest source of equity financing for biotechnology firms. 74 The
upstream market currently consists of about 1300 biotechnology firms,
which include primarily small firms that specialize in early product
development but also a handful of larger more established firms that
have some distribution and manufacturing capacities.5
Although strategic alliances in the biotechnology industry can take a
variety of more or less closely integrated forms, they typically involve a
large, downstream firm supplying product development capital to a
small, upstream firm in exchange for a license, usually exclusive, 6
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 371, 371-74 (1993) (examining sample of over 4000 strategic

technology alliances in several industries and arguing that most R&D sharing

arrangements are motivated either by technological complementarity, reduction of the
innovation time-span, and market access or influence over market structure); Oxley,
supra note 63, at 387-89 (examining sample of all horizontal technology transfer
alliances between public U.S. manufacturing firms during the 1980s and finding that the
degree of integration between participating firms often reflected several types of
contracting hazards); Gary P. Pisano, The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical
Analysis, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 153, 153-54, 162-73 (1990) (examining sample of R&D
project-level procurement choices (that is, whether to procure R&D inputs internally or
externally) in 1982 among world's top 50 pharmaceutical companies and finding that
decisions to procure R&D internally often appeared to be motivated by concentration of
R&D suppliers in the upstream market and a consequent fear of a "small-numbers"
bargaining problem).
72. See Gregory B. Abbott, Pharmaceuticaland Biotechnology Licensing and
Joint Ventures, 514 PLI/PAT. 37, 42-43, 45-46 (1998). See also ACHARYA, supra note 4,
at 21 (stating that the pharmaceutical industry exhibits strong market concentration and
consists of a small number of very large firms).
73. See Powell, supra note 18, at 204.
74. See JOSH LERNER & ROBERT P. MERGES, THE CONTROL OF STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY

COLLABORATIONS 4-5

(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6014, 1997).
75. See ACHARYA, supra note 4, at 20-21. The number of biotechnology firms
appears to have stabilized at this figure, although there is still significant exit and entry.
See id. at 34. One of the largest such firms, Genentech, has 10 marketing and
distribution partnerships with larger firms, 20 licensing arrangements, and 15 formal
research collaborations with small and large partners. See Powell, supra note 18, at 205.
76. See Abbott, supra note 72, at 53-57. The product license is usually a contested
negotiation topic since the biotechnology company often wants to attach field-of-use and
target restrictions if the product has multiple uses or multiple therapeutic targets. See id.
at 54. At the same time, the pharmaceutical company often wants to include
improvements in the license in order to strengthen its intellectual property rights as a
licensee. See id. at 56-57. An intermediate solution sometimes involves granting the
pharmaceutical company a right of first refusal if the biotechnology company develops
some kind of similar improvement. See id. If the contractual agreement awards the
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to market and/or manufacture the ultimate product.' Thus, the
biotechnology firm performs most of the applied research and early
product development and the large pharmaceutical firm usually is
responsible for marketing, distribution, and clinical testing to meet
regulatory requirements.7' A strategic alliance is a hybrid and relatively
novel organizational form that is structurally distinct from the small,
single-product corporation, and the large, multi-product, vertically
integrated corporation. 79 Although this hybrid form is widespread in
larger firm an exclusive license, the exclusivity clause may be conditioned on whether or
not the licensor expends a certain amount on marketing or is able to meet certain market
share or revenue milestones. See id. at 55-56. The licensee also often agrees to refrain
from using the licensed technology to manufacture or distribute new products that may
compete with the licensed products or to act as a manufacturer or distributor of
competing products of third parties. See id. Biotechnology companies that offer
research tools rather than therapeutic or diagnostic products tend to offer nonexclusive
licenses or limited exclusivity licenses, coupled with a "most favored nation" clause that
ensures uniform terms to all licensees. See id. See also GUTERMAN & EHRLICH, supra
note 15, at 130-31.
77. See Abbott, supra note 72, at 51. These capital investments often take the
form of equity purchases, which sometimes include representation on the board of
directors as well as rights or obligations to participate in future rounds of equity
financing. See id. Financing usually consists of a set of staggered payments, where only
the initial payment (sometimes in the form of an equity purchase) is guaranteed, later
payments are conditioned upon meeting certain performance milestones, and payments
progressively increase for later-stage milestones. See id. at 57. Typically, there is an
initial period when the licensee cannot cancel (usually three years) and an additional
period where it has an option to continue on a year-by-year basis (usually five years).
See id. at 59. Contractual agreements usually also provide for a management committee
that reviews general project progress and sets budget constraints and a research
committee that keeps track of scientific progress and determines future research tracks.
See id. at 52-53.
78. See PISANO, supra note 4, at 69. See also Paul Y. Mang, ExploitingInnovation
Options: An EmpiricalAnalysis of R&D-Intensive Firms, 35 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
229, 231 (1998) (stating that a biotechnology firm that decides to partner with a larger
downstream firm typically conducts research on the innovation until the product is ready
for clinical trials, at which point responsibility for testing, marketing, and distribution is
transferred to the downstream partner).
79. See Arnold Picot et al., The Fading Boundaries of the Firm: The Role of
Information and Communication Technology, 152 J.INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
EcON. 65, 65-66 (1996) (stating that the classical definition of the firm as a discrete and
independent entity no longer describes the structure of many corporate operations, which
more typically take the form of interdependent alliances among several market actors);
Powell, supra note 18, at 197 (stating that the "canonical large corporation" is being
replaced by more flexible forms of corporate organization, including networks, hybrids,
and various symbiotic arrangements); Teece, supra note 66, at 207 (stating that the
metaphor of the firm as an "island" needs to be modified because "firms commonly need
to form strategic alliances, vertically (both upstream and downstream), laterally, and
sometimes horizontally in order to develop and commercialize new technologies").
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several research-intensive industries, it is widely recognized that the
biotechnology industry relies especially heavily on this form of
organization.'o Unlike a corporate merger that integrates completely the
resources of two firms, a strategic alliance involves a partial integration
of common resources and allows each participating firm or institution to
retain a substantial degree of independent decisionmaking capabilities.
Industrial economists categorize an alliance as a network form of

organization that confounds the conventional dichotomy between the
hierarchical relations of a vertically integrated corporation and the
market interactions that exist between independent contracting parties. 8

Unlike market interactions between organizationally independent actors,
an alliance avoids the high coordination costs and monitoring costs of a
contractual relationship through partially integrated research facilities

and management personnel. As an entity that is not fully integrated,
however, an alliance also avoids the bureaucratic inflexibility and high

dissolution costs of a merged hierarchical firm.
Network innovation structures offer an attractive vehicle for private
investment in fundamental R&D because they reduce the project risk to

which any individual firm is exposed while maintaining the
organizational independence of each participating entity. The imperfect
character of currently available patent protection encourages innovating

firms to enter into these technology-sharing alliances to make up the
appropriability shortfall and capture a greater portion of a research
project's knowledge spillovers. But these cooperative ventures are
hardly a second-best organizational choice: strategic interfirm alliances
80. See Powell, supra note 18, at 198.
81. See Beije & Groenewegen, supra note 59, at 103-04. See also LORANGE &
Roos, supra note 70, at 3-4 (locating different types of strategic alliances along a
continuum ranging from hierarchies or total integration to markets or no integration);
Balakrishnan & Koza, supra note 71, at 100-01 (showing that a joint venture has some
characteristics of a hierarchical organization and some characteristics of a marketmediated contractual arrangement); Hagedoom, supra note 71, at 371 (stating that
"transaction cost economics inspired contributions ... have theorized interfirm
partnering as an economic phenomenon in between market transactions and hierarchies"
(internal citation omitted)); Oxley, supra note 63, at 388-92 (proposing a markethierarchy continuum as the basis for classifying the large variety of interfirm alliances
and distinguishing between three rough alliance categories, including unilateral contract
agreements, bilateral contract greements, and equity-based alliances); Picot et al., supra
note 79, at 66 (stating that strategic alliances do not conform to the "traditional
differentiation between firms and markets [which] suggests that hierarchical mechanisms
are used within firms and market mechanisms between firms"); Pisano, supra note 65, at
109 (stating that "[i]nterfirm arrangements are often viewed as intermediate or hybrid
forms along an institutional continuum of markets to hierarchies"); Teece, supra note 66,
at 207 (comparing the structure of a strategic alliance between two or more firms to
contractual arrangements among individual firms and a hierarchy within a single
corporation). For the classic articulation of the basic distinction between market-based
and hierarchical forms of organization, see WLLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 20-40.
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are a highly efficient mechanism for spreading two types of risks
inherent in fundamental innovation projects. If this is true, then
imperfect patent rights may attract private investment in biotechnology
product development by fostering the formation of cooperative ventures
that efficiently spread the high risks of developing and marketing a
biotechnology product.
i.

Market Uncertainty

Small firms or academic researchers involved in network innovation
projects contract out the market uncertainty82 of advanced product
development and product distribution to large firms. There are several
reasons why small firms may be eager to do so. These firms have

difficulty maintaining financing during the advanced stages of product
development, which is often a lengthy process for pharmaceutical and
medical-therapeutic products that must pass through the FDA clinical
trial and approval regimen. 3 Relative to small firms, large companies

can reduce the costs of the approval, clinical testing, and marketing
stages of product development through established facilities and
significant economies of scale. 4 Furthermore, because small firms have
few established distribution relationships and little market experience,

and cannot afford maintaining idle production and distribution capacity,
they may not maximize profits (or the probability of successful entry) if
they underestimate consumer demand for a new product." Distribution
82. Some commentators distinguish between two forms of uncertainty. Market
uncertaintyrefers to the fact that innovators may be uncertain as to whether there will be
sufficient demand for the planned product and whether the input costs of production will
lie at cost-effective levels. See FREEMAN & SOETE, supra note 37, at 242-45. Technical
uncertaintyrefers to the fact that innovators may be uncertain as to whether the project
will result in a technically feasible application. See id. at 243. For explanations of this
distinction, see id. at 242-64; MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SC-VARTZ, MARKET
STRUCTUR AND INNOVATION 109-10 (1982).
83. See LERNER & MERGES, supra note 74, at 12-14 (surveying sample of 200
strategic alliances between biotech firms and larger pharmaceutical manufacturers, and
finding that two-thirds of these alliances were arranged when the biotech start-ups were

in poor financial health and had not yet begun preclinical development through animal
studies).
84. See Pisano, supra note 71, at 155 (stating that large pharmaceutical firms have
an advantage over smaller biotechnology firms because they have years of commercial
experience and existing organizational capabilities to commercialize products and
product distribution).
85. See id. (stating that young firms with novel technologies frequently lack the
resources or expertise to market their product effectively). See also GUTrERMAN &
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of pharmaceutical products is highly labor intensive, and major
companies employ thousands of salespersons to approach physicians and
hospitals directly.86 Additionally, small firms may not be able to
withstand protracted patent litigation and are vulnerable to sham
infringement suits."
ii.

Technical Uncertainty

Technology-sharing alliances also enable large firms to contract out
the technical uncertainty" surrounding basic research to universities and
start-ups. This fact may seem puzzling, since larger, deep-pocket firms
would seem to have superior ability to carry out expensive and uncertain
research projects and strong incentives not to contract out potentially
lucrative research projects to possible market entrants. However, a large
firm may find that it can maintain a well-diversified innovation portfolio

at lower cost by partnering with smaller firms to conduct basic and
applied research than by directly bearing the risk and development costs
of uncertain R&D projects. Given the high probability of failure for

basic research projects, large-finm

managers may prefer offering

supra note 15, at 93-94 (stating that, for a new entrant "a licensing agreement
with an experienced distributor will facilitate rapid market entry and allow the licensor to
generate revenue from sales in a new market without the need to commit any significant
new capital to the development of a direct sales force in the market").
86. See LERNER & MERGES, supra note 74, at 18 (noting that almost all
pharmaceutical firms have large sales forces, "which engage in the time-consuming
process of developing personal relationships with doctors and hospital administrators").
EHRLICH,

But see John W. Campo, Jr., Strategiesfor Exploiting Biotechnology Patent Rights, 382

PLI/PAT 495, 511-12 (1994) (stating that this distribution pattern may change because
managed health care and other reforms are generating centralized purchasing entities for
pharmaceutical products).
87. See LANJO.V & LERNER, supra note 27, at 1(stating that the costs of litigation
fall most heavily on small firms, which may be forced to settle because they cannot
obtain financing for a long-term litigation).
88. See supra note 82.
89. See Margaret Meyer et al., Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and
Ownership Changes, 1 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 9, 16-17 (1992) (stating that larger

firms may prefer alliances over mergers because small high-technology firms often
engage in high-risk development projects and project failure could affect adversely the
health of the acquiror). See also P.A. GEROSKI, MARKET DYNAMICS AND ENTRY 220
(1991) (stating that "a pattern that one might expect to observe is that of innovations
undertaken by outsiders and then taken over by insiders [that is, incumbent firms] who
would be only too happy to pay the present discounted value (to the outsider) of the
innovation in the not too infrequent situations where it is worth more to the insider than
to the outsider"). For a more general behavioral analysis of the considerations that
managers of large pharmaceutical firms face in deciding whether to enter into an alliance
with a small biotech firm, see generally Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella,

Evaluating Technological Information and Utilizing It: Scientific Knowledge,
Technological Capability,and External Linkages in Biotechnology, 24 J. ECON. BEHAV.

& ORG. 91 (1994).
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financing to a small firm to conduct a risky R&D project that, if
unsuccessful, could adversely affect the large firm's stock performance
and the manager's job security. This economic calculus makes even
more sense in today's economic climate, where large pharmaceutical
firms face steeply declining pricing flexibility and falling profit margins
due to patent expirations, large-volume buying from managed-care
programs, and strong competition from generic drugs. 9
2.

The Vices of Complete PatentProtection

Industry-industry
and industry-university
alliances in the
biotechnology sector facilitate innovative development by exploiting the
specific types of risk-bearing capacities that are peculiar to small-firm
and large-finm organizations. Imperfect forms of patent protection may
have catalyzed these innovation networks by: (1) reducing the
commitment costs faced by potential partners in negotiating the terms of
strategic alliances, and (2) encouraging firms to enter into cooperative
networks that enable participants to capture an innovation product's
knowledge spillovers. The innovative vitality of these innovation
networks, and the relative absence of such alliances prior to the
introduction of patent rights in 1980, strongly suggest that patent rights
may be crucial transaction-cost-reducing devices that facilitate private
investment in highly uncertain R&D projects. But if this is true, then
should we not prefer the most complete forms of patent protection to the
currently incomplete forms of patent protection? This Section rebuts
this intuitive response by showing that a regime of perfect patent
coverage is unlikely to induce private industry to invest in fundamental
project innovation at socially optimal levels.
A regime of perfect patent protection grants "prospect" patents that
cover most, or all, of a particular innovation's therapeutic yield. A
prospect patent allows its holder to recover most or all of the rents
generated by the protected innovation. Because major biotechnological
innovations are likely to cover a broad range of subsequent
improvements, this regime probably tends to concentrate intellectual
property rights to a wide array of fundamental research materials and
techniques in the hands of a few large firms. Each of these large-firm
patent holders would effectively have a dominant share within a
particular innovation market and have the power to coordinate all
90.

See PISANO, supra note 4, at 57-64.
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subsequent research in that market. Relying on several well-established
strands in the innovation literature, this Section advances three reasons
why this perfect patent regime, and the concentrated innovation market
structure to which it leads, is unlikely to cultivate effectively the
therapeutic potential of the genetic commons. These reasons include:
(1) large firm managers' risk-averse tendencies to avoid costly and
uncertain R&D projects, (2) a large firm's hierarchical tendencies that
tend to stifle radically innovative activities, and (3) a dominant firm's
rational interest in maximizing profits by postponing fundamental

innovations that may cannibalize existing product lines. Together, these
arguments show that a perfect patent regime is unlikely to stimulate
biotechnological innovation at socially adequate levels because it
concentrates essential scientific resources in large firms that have little
ability, or incentive, to develop these resources independently.
a. ManagerialRisk Aversion
A patent regime that concentrates genetic resources in the hands of a
few large firms assigns valuable intellectual resources to large-firm
managers who have comparatively weak incentives to conduct the highrisk R&D that is required to develop biopharmaceutical products. This
incentive problem is a function of the separation of ownership and
management within a large, publicly traded firm." Large-firm managers
have relatively weak incentives to endorse a risky R&D project since
they expect to share in a small portion of the pecuniary gains if the
project succeeds but a large portion of the reutational cost, up to and
including job termination, if the project fails. Even if a large firm has
access to plentiful capital reserves to fund basic research, its risk-averse
managers may prefer incremental innovations that improve cash flow
and share prices in the short term, rather than big-ticket projects that

91. There is a large literature on the "agency costs" that derive from the separation
of ownership and management within publicly traded firms. For the classic sources, see
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcON. 288
(1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
92. See OSTER, supra note 70, at 303. See also OLIVER E. WLLIAMSON, THE
EcoNoMic INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING

41-42 (1985) (stating that innovation incentives may be weak in a large firm because it is
difficult to design a compensation scheme that reflects accurately responsibility for
innovative output); David Hirshleifer & Yoon Suh, Risk, ManagerialEffort, and Project

Choice, 2 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 308, 308-09 (1992) (stating that "it is harder to
motivate a manager to make the right decisions when projects differ in risk" and that
"managers will avoid projects that are subject to early and conspicuous failure in order to

maintain their reputations as good judges of project quality").
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deplete cash flow and have a highly uncertain and deferred return.93
Temporary share price fluctuations often accompany analysts' following
of big-ticket research projects,94 and visible project failure may injure the
firm's future ability to access the capital markets.95 Furthermore, many
major innovation projects may be unlikely to reach completion during
top managers' expected tenure." All these factors drive large-firm
managers to adopt a "fast-second" or an accommodation strategy where
the firm allows new entrants to incur the initial development and
debugging costs in a new innovation field and then uses its internal
R&D capacities rapidly to design a superior product package.97 This is
precisely the strategy that many large pharmaceutical firms initially
adopted toward the biotechnology industry, as they postponed large
investments in internal biotechnology R&D while waiting to see if any
start-up firms would successfully develop marketable therapies.9"
Small biotechnology firms do not suffer substantially from these
excessively risk-averse tendencies since management and ownership
usually are not separated and only one quarter of these firms are publicly
traded.99 If owners and managers are not separated, or there is
significant profit sharing, the owners/managers can expect to pocket a
sizable portion of the gains from a successful innovation and thus have
greater incentives to select high-risk/high-return R&D projects. Unlike
large-firm managers, small-firm managers are exposed to significant
portions of not only the downside risk but also the upside gain of a
research project. This fact may remain true even as a biotechnology
firm grows and ownership becomes more diffuse, since small-firm
93. On the relation between agency costs, the choice of R&D projects, and
investment horizons, see Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, in THE
131, 131-53 (Richard H. Day et
al. eds., 1993). See also Jonathan B. Baker, FringeFirms and Incentives to Innovate, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 621, 638 (1995) (stating that risk-averse managers may reject R&D
projects even if the proposed innovation has a greater expected return than alternative,
safer investments).
94. See Bara Vaida, Biotech Can Puzzle Best Analysts, (visited Oct. 22, 2000)
<http://linkage.rockefeller.edu/wli/news/biotech-pick.html> (stating that biotechnology
stocks are highly volatile and often suffer sharp price downturns, and that analysts have
difficulty evaluating progress of firm research).
95. See Holmstrom, supra note 93, at 132-33 (stating that concerns for reputation
in the capital markets lead large firms to act cautiously in selecting investment projects,
since poor performance can constrain the future availability of affordable capital).
96. See Teece, supra note 66, at 202.
97. See Baker, supra note 93, at 638.
MARKETS FOR INNOVATION, OVNERSHIP AND CONTROL

98. See ACHARYA, supra note 4, at 25.
99.

See Abbott, supra note 72, at 46-47.
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managers recognize that the firm's only comparative advantage, and its
sole means of maintaining market share, relies on developing

fundamental product innovations.
b.

OrganizationalIncompetencies

Even if the risk-aversion claim is untrue, and most large-firm
managers strive valiantly to develop fundamental innovations, the
argument against a perfect patent regime still stands. This is because
large firms generally lack the organizational competence to develop

fundamental product innovations. Some theories of organization view
the firm as a collection of actors who rationally join together to
maximize revenues by apportioning numerous tasks among agents with

specialized skill sets."° Because each agent performs a single task
repeatedly, it can execute that task more efficiently than an agent who
operates alone and is responsible for performing several tasks. There is
a tradeoff, however, between the returns to specialization achieved by
cooperative action and the costs of communication within a large
group.10' As a firm grows in size, the simple fact of large numbers forces
a large organization to develop a bureaucracy that distributes
information among a large number of agents and to institute a
multidivisional hierarchy that monitors the performance of each of those
agents.' 2 For this reason, although large numbers may result in
impressive time savings and economies of scale in distribution and

manufacture, large numbers may also hamper firms from achieving

creative insights or investing rapidly in radical product innovations'0 3 A
100.

See Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm As a Communication

Network, 109 Q.J. EcON. 809, 810 (1994). For other treatments of information
processing capabilities, organizational structure, and innovation competencies, see

Stephen J. DeCanio & William E. Watkins, Infonnation Processingand Organizational
Structure,36 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 275 (1998); Teece, supra note 66.

101.
102.

See Bolton & Devatripont, supra note 100, at 811.
See DeCanio & Watkins, supra note 100, at 287-88 (stating that a firm's

choice of organizational structure often rests on a tradeoff between multiplying
managerial levels to reduce informational overload and generating frictions that may
result from an excess of hierarchical channels). See also WLLAMSON, supra note 92, at
134 (stating that "[i]f any one manager can deal directly with only a limited number of
subordinates, then increasing firm size necessarily entails adding hierarchical levels");
Teece, supra note 66, at 200 (stating that "[dlecision making processes in hierarchical
organizations almost always involve bureaucratic features").
103. See WILLUISON, supra note 10, at 200-01 (stating that "[s]ince innovation...
tends to be untidy, innovation-which is a poorly structured, high-risk activity-may not
be an activity which the large, mature bureaucracy is constitutionally well-suited to
handle"). Interestingly, historical experience from the period up to 1980 demonstrates
that when small, entrepreneurial Silicon Valley firms acquired large, vertically integrated
firms, the organizational controls of the large corporation tended to destroy the
entrepreneurial capacities of the smaller company. See Teece, supra note 66, at 212
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hierarchical structure that channels information and responsibilities
through numerous agents may diminish the speed with which the firm
reacts to information about changed market conditions and the
receptivity with which it contemplates new product concepts.' °
Small firms do not face the large-numbers problem, and thus do not
need to construct hierarchical communication and monitoring structures
that may inhibit creative research and adaptive flexibility. Smaller,
research-intensive firms tend to exhibit shallow hierarchies, low degrees
of compartmentalization, and a higher concentration of decision-making
authority in the founding individuals. 5 Although outside venture capital
may impose resource constraints and creditor monitoring, this external
pressure may lead small firms to pursue fundamental innovations that
give them a comparative advantage over incumbent firms. Extensive
empirical studies confirm this claim, showing that large firms do not
engage in greater levels of R&D intensity than small firms and that
small firms generate a disproportionate share of major innovations.' °
n.32.

104. See DeCanio & Watkins, supra note 100, at 290 (stating that "an
organization's size may constrain its speed in adopting innovations"); Thomas M. Jorde

& David J. Teece, Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and
Antitrust, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 84 (1990) (stating that "one property of large integrated
structures is that they have the potential to become excessively hierarchical and less
responsive to market needs"); Teece, supra note 66, at 201 (stating that innovation is
often "ill served" by bureaucratic structures since the "new and the radical will almost
always appear threatening to some constituents" of the representative structure).
105. See Teece, supra note 66, at 213.
106. See GEROSKI, supra note 89, at 220-22. The author reviews a variety of studies
that assess any possible correlation between firm size and the rate of innovative output.
Although there is some interindustry variation, most studies report higher innovation
rates in smaller firms. Thus, although the vast majority of total R&D expenditures
derives from larger firms, smaller firms usually account for a major share of new
innovations in most industries. See id. Furthermore, numerous studies find that large
firms bias their R&D portfolio toward minor innovations and rely heavily on small firms
for basic ideas that can serve as the basis for incremental commercial applications. See
id. On some of the methodological difficulties that may undercut the results of these
studies, see KAMIEN & SCHVARTZ, supra note 82, at 49-50. The authors observe that
empirical efforts to correlate firm size, R&D expenditures, and monopoly share with
rates of innovation are problematic because: (1) it is difficult to define an innovation, (2)
it is difficult to categorize innovations as major or minor, (3) it is difficult to measure
innovative output because not all innovations are patented and not all patents are
commercialized, and (4) it is difficult to measure innovative input because R&D
expenditures do not reflect the contributions of nonresearch personnel. See id. at 50. For
some representative studies, see Zoltan J. Acs & David. B. Audretsch, Innovation in
Large and Small Firms: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 678, 678-88 (1988)
(examining data on innovations introduced to market in 1982 and showing that: (I) firms
employing less than 500 workers produced almost half of all innovations in that period,
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The current state of the biopharmaceutical industry backs up this general
finding. Whereas pharmaceutical companies concentrate R&D resources
on low-risk improvements to existing drugs and have a "thin product
pipeline," biotechnology firms concentrate resources in fundamental

innovation projects and, if successful, generally have many novel
products in development.'
c.

The Very Rational Fearof Cannibalism

Even if the risk aversion and organizational incompetence claims
prove to be unfounded, the argument against perfect, broadly defined
patents might still stand. Even a large firm that has the managerial
incentives and the organizational competence to conduct fundamental
R&D may have no rational profit incentive to develop or immediately
introduce a fundamental product innovation that will displace an existing
product line. If a large firm has a dominant market share and faces few

potential entrants, it may be reluctant to undertake or accelerate
development projects that may generate radical innovations that could
cannibalize the existing profit stream of current products.' 3 Relative to a
(2) market concentration is negatively correlated with innovation activity, (3) large-firm
composition is positively correlated with number of innovation products, and (4) small
firms represent a disproportionate amount of innovative activity even in markets
dominated by large firms); Welsey M. Cohen et al., Finn Size and R&D Intensity: A ReExamination, 35 J. IND. ECON. 543 (1987) (examining data on R&D investment by large

number of firms in various industries during period of 1974-1977 and finding that
overall firm size has a statistically insignificant effect on R&D intensity).
107. Powell, supra note 18, at 203. Incidentally, small-scale operations are
particularly well-suited to the technology of biopharmaceutical development, which has
replaced traditional "mass testing" methods that rely on economies of scale with rational
drug design that relies on highly specialized research personnel and can be accomplished
effectively in small laboratories. See COMPETITION POLICY REPORT, supra note 11,
§ l.B.3.a, at 22. Conventional development of pharmaceutical products generally
requires scale economies since it relies on a "trial by error" method that consists of mass
testing of a wide range of potentially therapeutic chemical compounds. See Powell,
supra note 18, at 204. The company selects a disease market and then takes a group of
chemical compounds and screens them for therapeutic efficacy against the disease. See
id. Thus, the company achieves success through a laborious process and with little
understanding of the reason for success. For a more detailed description of "random
screening," see PIsANO, supra note 4, at 55-56. By contrast, biopharmaceutical
development has begun to rely on "genetic approaches" that investigate the biochemistry
of a disease and then work backward to find a naturally occurring organic molecule or
design a chemically synthesized organic molecule that will inhibit a chemical reaction
involved in the disease. See COMPETION POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, § 1.B.3.a.
108. See KAMiEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 110 (stating that firm managers
may face conflicting motives in contemplating developing a product innovation, since
the "carrot" of extraordinary profits from the new innovation conflicts with the "stick" of
existing profits on an existing product innovation); LERNER & MERGES, supra note 74, at
17 (stating that a pharmaceutical manufacturer may not want to develop therapeutic
products for a disease where it has an existing product for fear that the new, superior
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potential entrant, a dominant firm that already extracts monopoly profits
from an existing product has lower incentives to introduce a fundamental
innovation that will partially or entirely displace that product.'9

Whereas the potential entrant expects to gain the entire profit stream
from the proposed innovation, the dominant firm expects to gain the new
profit stream minus the displaced profit stream from existing products." °
Depending on the expected profits from the new innovation, the current
profits from the existing innovation, and the potential for preemptive
development by known or unknown rivals, a dominant firm may find
that delayed development is its profit-maximizing strategy."' By
product may cannibalize existing sales); Baker, supra note 93, at 636 (stating that a
dominant firm will choose to accommodate entry where heavy R&D investment may
generate products that will "cannibalize" existing products and yield fewer net returns).
109. Kenneth Arrow first made this point. See Arrow, supra note 45, at 619-22
(finding that a monopolist, which already extracts a monopoly profit, has less to gain
from an innovation that would cannibalize its existing earnings than a firm in a
competitive industry, which begins with zero economic profit). See also Jennifer F.
Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, in 1
HANDBOOK OF hNDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849, 851 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989) (stating that "[w]hen innovation is uncertain, a firm which currently
enjoys a large market share will invest at a lower rate than a potential entrant, for an
innovation which promises the winner a large share of the market"); Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 402, 402
(1987) (showing that postdevelopment dissemination of an invention, either through
licensing or imitation, will cause noninnovating firms to benefit from the invention, and
that this fact means that dominant firms will tend to develop minor innovations and will
only develop major innovations if imitation is difficult).
110. This incentive problem can be illustrated numerically. If P , (the firm's preinnovation profits) = $5, and P2 (the firm's expected postinnovation profits) = $10, then
the incumbent firm's managers can only expect to yield $5 (that is, P2 - P) from the

proposed innovation. By contrast, a potential entrant who is seeking to develop the
proposed innovation can expect to yield $10 (the undiluted P,) in postinnovation profits
if it succeeds. Thus, in the stylized example where the subsequent innovation entirely
displaces the existing innovation, a small-firm manager has stronger profit-based
incentives to innovate than the large-firm manager.
111. Admittedly, there are few documented examples of this type of behavior in the
antitrust case law. A good illustration is found in the facts of McDonald v. Johnson &
Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1983). The plaintiffs had developed an electronic pain

control device and then sold out to Johnson & Johnson after having been given

assurances that the acquiror would develop and promote the technology. See id. at 1372.
The plaintiffs alleged that Johnson & Johnson effectively suppressed the acquired
technology because it posed a threat to its over-the-counter and prescription drug
business. See id. at 1372-73. Although the district court upheld the plaintiffs' claim, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the antitrust claims due to lack of standing,
proximate causation, and lack of cognizable injury under the antitrust laws (largely
because the plaintiffs had voluntarily entered into the buy-out agreement). See id. at
1373.
The history of innovation also includes several possible instances where incumbent
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postponing the development or introduction of a radical product
innovation, a dominant firm that faces few potential entry threats may
maximize the total profit stream it can gain from its existing products
plus the new innovation (minus the opportunity cost of delaying the new
innovation).
3.

ClosingArgument: The Casefor Imperfect Patents

The introduction of patent protection for biotechnological innovations,

coupled with federal funding of basic science research, has triggered the
formation of network forms of organization to conduct highspillover/high-risk innovation in the biopharmaceutical sector. The
existence of a federally funded knowledge base reduces the start-up
costs of fundamental research and supplies private industry with highly
trained university researchers. At the same time, industry-industry or
industry-university alliances enhance the ability of research partners to
capture a greater portion of the broad prospect of knowledge spillovers
either through shared patent holdings or nonpatent devices such as
distribution and production efficiencies. Without these collaborative
devices, firms would incur prohibitive development costs in "reinventing
the wheel" and, consequently, substantial free-rider costs as the result of
knowledge giveaways. As a result, fundamental product innovation
would lie beyond the sustainable project horizon of all but the very
largest firms. That is a socially undesirable outcome because large-firm
managers have few incentives to divert internal cash flow toward these
uncertain investments and poor organizational competencies to direct
fundamental innovation projects.
Strangely enough, the key to the biotechnology sector's vigorous
investment in fundamental innovation lies in the insufficiency of
currently available forms of patent protection. This is for two reasons.
First, imperfect forms of patent protection that cover only a portion of
expected spillovers encourage innovators to enter into collaborative
interfirm relationships to cover the appropriability shortfall. Second,

patent rights reduce dramatically buyers' and sellers' commitment costs
in negotiating the terms of these interfirm development projects.
Although it is certainly true that patent entitlements directly encourage
firms sought to defend their monopoly share by suppressing new innovations that could
displace existing products and trigger a competitive market. See Richard Dunford, The
Suppression of Technology As a Strategy for Controlling Resource Dependence, 32

Sci. Q. 512, 514-16 (1987) (citing historical evidence that AT&T may have
delayed the introduction of the automatic telephone because of "patent consolidation"
concerns, and that General Electric delayed the introduction of fluorescent lighting
because it wished first to saturate the market for incandescent lighting).
ADMIN.
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private investment in biotechnological R&D, an incentive theory of
patent protection tells less than half the story about the role that patents
play in encouraging such investment. Applied to the biotechnology
sector, an unqualified incentive theory cannot explain how imperfect
forms of patent protection ameliorate investors' rational bias against
high-spillover innovation projects. A transaction-cost theory, which

shows that patent rights mitigate buyers' and sellers' commitment
difficulties in forming interfirm ventures, fills this theoretical gap.
This transaction-cost rationale shows why imperfect forms of patent
protection dominate two alternative regulatory strategies to stimulate
biotechnology innovation. A no-patents strategy would force innovators
to incur insurmountable costs in negotiating collaborative arrangements
that close the appropriability gap between incremental and fundamental
innovation projects. A perfect patents strategy would consolidate
broadly defined patents in the hands of a few large firms, impose
substantial accessibility costs, and probably slow down the rate of
radical innovation. While the no-patents strategy pays for high
accessibility at the price of reduced productivity, the perfect patents
strategy at best pays for high productivity at the price of low
accessibility and, at worst, pays for low productivity at the price of low
accessibility. In contrast to both of these alternatives, an imperfect
patent strategy solves the spillover problem without reducing
accessibility to fundamental innovations. Imperfect patent coverage
encourages potential innovators to follow a two-step innovation process,
where they incur the development costs of generating and patenting a
valuable intellectual asset and then seek research partners to bring that
product to the marketability stage. Because available patent awards fail
to cover a large portion of the appropriability shortfall, buyers and
sellers of innovative inputs have incentives to enter into network
agreements that internalize expected spillovers. At the same time,
imperfect patent entitlements operate as a facilitator mechanism that
reduces the substantial costs which can prevent sellers from committing
credibly to the value of their assets and can prevent buyers from
committing credibly to nonopportunistic behavior. By stimulating the
formation of interfirm ventures to carry out high-risk/high-spillover

innovation projects, imperfect forms of patent protection ultimately may
yield accessibility benefits.
It is possible to object that perfect forms of patent protection may not
always inhibit the formation of technology-sharing interfirm structures.
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Relying primarily on evidence from the copyright context, Robert
Merges has argued that strong forms of intellectual property protection
do not inhibit the dissemination of intellectual property because
copyright holders form collective licensing associations that can
overcome the costs of repeated licensing negotiations.'12 A transactioncost theory of patent protection suggests that this argument certainly
does not hold for patent protection in the biotechnology sector and, most
likely, does not hold for patent protection generally. To see why this is
the case, we need to return to the concept of public goods. One respect
in which patentable assets differ from copyrightable assets is that
patentable discoveries do not fully meet the nonrivalrousness condition
of a public good. Whereas the value of a copyrighted song does not
decline, and probably rises, with each additional user who purchases and
plays the song, the value of a patented gene sequence declines
dramatically as each additional improver reduces the patented
innovation's remaining therapeutic yield. This means that a copyright
holder has every incentive to license to as many users as possible, while
a patent holder has incentives to license to a very limited number of
users (or often, to no users at all).' Whereas the copyright holder
preserves the value of the copyrighted asset by expanding the number of
licensees, the patent holder preserves the value of the patented asset by
constraining, or eliminating, the number of licensees. This insight
explains why strong forms of patent protection are undesirable in the
biotechnology sector. Whereas strong forms of copyright protection do
not harm incentives for copyright holders to license, strong forms of
patent protection may diminish incentives for patent holders to license.
Because perfect forms of patent protection cover a broad prospect of
subsequent applications, they enable a single innovating firm to capture
independently a larger portion of the expected spillovers and,
consequently, diminish its incentive to enter into collaborative ventures
that may dilute its monopoly profits.
Even if empirical evidence were to cast doubt on the claim that perfect
forms of patent protection generally will result in socially inadequate
levels of fundamental innovation, the transaction-cost argument for
imperfect patent protection still holds for the biotechnology sector.
Even if perfect and imperfect forms of patent protection both would
result in socially adequate levels of fundamental innovation, an
112. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1391-93 (1996).
113. See Nelsen, supra note 29, at 30 (stating that the licensing value of many
commercially valuable biological materials "may decrease as the number of people
having access to them increases, because the objective is to get a time advantage over
competitive researchers").
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imperfect regime still would be preferable because it enhances the
accessibility of fundamental innovations. Because patent monopolies
impose distributive and allocative costs," 4 it is always preferableceteris paribus-to minimize patent scope and duration that inflate those
costs. Counterintuitively, imperfect patent rights stimulate socially
adequate levels of fundamental R&D investment through innovation
networks that preserve or enhance the accessibility levels which would
exist if patent protection were less complete or if patent protection were
nonexistent. Just as counterintuitively, incomplete patent protection
probably results in a higher rate of fundamental innovation in the
biotechnology sector than would exist if patent protection were more
complete. By parceling out the genetic commons to a research
community that has the organizational competence and profit-based
incentives to cultivate that information base, incomplete patent
protection triggers innovation networks that efficiently extract the
therapeutic yield of the genetic commons.
D. Epilogue: Transcending the SchumpeterianDebate

The academic literature on innovation policy has often consisted of
inconclusive debates over the so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis:
namely, the claim that technological advance proceeds faster under
concentrated, or even monopolistic, market conditions." 5 On the one

hand, opponents of the hypothesis have argued that small-scale
organizations or individual entrepreneurs have greater managerial
freedom and behavioral incentives to conduct creative innovation
114.

See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.

115. For reviews of the debate over the Schumpeterian hypothesis, see GEROSKI,
supra note 89, at 214-29; KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 22-48; RICHARD R.
NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 275351 (1982). To be more precise, the Schumpeterian hypothesis actually covers two
logically independent hypotheses: (1) the claim that market concentration correlates
positively with R&D intensity, and (2) the claim that large firm size correlates positively
with R&D intensity. Schumpeter roughly argued for both of these claims when he
suggested that departures from perfectly competitive market structures-a category that
could encompass large firm size and monopoly power-were most conducive to the
development of innovative technologies. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPrrALiSM,
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 131-34 (5th ed. 1976). In his earlier work, Schumpeter
appeared to embrace almost the contrary position by identifying the central catalyst of
innovative development as the individual entrepreneur who "carries out new
combinations" and disrupts the dominant position of incumbent firms. JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 128-56 (Redvers Opie trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (1934).
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projects. ' 6 On the other hand, proponents have argued that large
organizations exhibit economies of scale, cash flow reserves, and
appropriability advantages that facilitate complex, expensive, and longterm innovation projects."7
Extensive empirical testing of the
Schumpeterian hypothesis has yielded few definitive conclusions. " '
The market structure of the biotechnological sector suggests that it is
sometimes possible to bridge the gap between each side of the
Schumpeterian debate. The network forms of organization that link the
concentrated downstream market and the diffuse upstream market in the

biotechnology industry offer an innovation model that may, within this
context, transcend the debate over the Schumpeterian hypothesis. Part
of the key to the recent success and technological advances of the

biotechnological sector lies in the coexistence of and interaction between

"entrepreneurial" and "routinized" innovation regimes."9 Each regime
type exemplifies one side of the debate over the Schumpeterian

hypothesis. The symbiotic network that links these two regimes appears
to solve the tradeoff between economies of scale in clinical
development, marketing, and distribution and small-scale organizational
flexibility and production incentives in fundamental innovation. 2
116.
117.
118.

See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 115, at 279-80.
See id.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 176-77. On this point, Williamson writes:

"An 'optimum' degree of competition, which holds across all industries and all times, for
promoting technical progress cannot be established by appeal to either theoretical
argument or empirical analysis." Id.
119. Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter distinguish between "routinized" and
"entrepreneurial" regimes of innovation activity. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note
115, at 275-351; Sidney G. Winter, Schumpeterian Competition in Alternative
Technological Regimes, 5 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 287, 293-97 (1984). For a similar

distinction, see Beije & Groenewegen, supra note 59, at 101-02 (distinguishing between
"routinized" and "adaptive" forms of production). Firms that operate under a routinized
regime have a dominant market share, attain a competitive advantage in innovative
readiness by learning through doing, and concentrate on cumulative technological
advances that maintain sales of existing products. Routinized innovation principally
includes cost-reducing activities such as retailoring products to consumer preferences
(debugging), process modifications, and imitative reverse engineering. See id. It also
includes rent-seeking activities that seek to extend dominant market share through
marginal improvements that enhance brand image and visibility. See id. Good examples
are annual updates of textbooks or automobiles that bring little added quality value to the
existing product but may inflate sales, either by attracting consumer attention or enticing
consumers to exchange old product versions for the new version. By contrast, firms that
operate under an entrepreneurial regime generally have little market share and
concentrate on identifying and developing radical innovations that will permit successful
entry into a concentrated market. See id. For some empirical data supporting this
hypothesis, see Acs & Audretsch, supra note 106, at 688 (stating that "there is
considerable support for Winter's ... hypothesis that different economic and
technological regimes may account for at least some of the differences between the
innovation activity of large and small firms").
120. Interestingly, the bifurcated network structure of the biotechnology industry

1032

[VOL. 37: 987, 2000]

Cultivating the Genetic Commons
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

On the one hand, an entrepreneurial regime in the R&D input market
supplies most of the innovative breakthroughs that large-firm managers
have weak profit incentives and poor organizational abilities to pursue.
Downstream distributors are likely to produce far fewer radically
innovative technologies in the absence of a competitive upstream market
that supplies fundamental R&D inputs and provides indirect access to
the academic knowledge stock. By relying on upstream start-ups for
fundamental R&D inputs, risk-averse downstream managers avoid much
of the uncertainty and negative cash flow of basic-science research
projects. On the other hand, a routinized technological regime in the
downstream market generates a manufacturing, debugging, and
distribution apparatus that most upstream suppliers, who suffer from
diseconomies of scale and market inexperience, cannot expect to
replicate at competitive cost levels. Without a concentrated downstream

market that reduces the cost of product manufacture and diffusion,
outside creditors would hold back R&D financing for upstream
suppliers. By establishing a pattern of nonopportunistic collaboration
with upstream suppliers, a downstream distributor or a group of
downstream firms may lead upstream firms (and their potential
creditors) to expect that a reliable downstream partner will be available
for an initially high-risk project. As a result, cash-starved biotechnology
start-ups can obtain outside funding for the early research that leads to
marketable product innovations and ultimately attracts scale-efficient
distribution partners in the downstream market.
IV.

ACCESS SUSTAINED: ANTITRUST CURES FOR

PATENT CONSOLIDATION

Part II presented compelling grounds for believing that the extension
of imperfect patent rights to the genetic commons, and the resulting rise
of numerous innovation networks, may encourage fundamental product
innovation in the biotechnology sector. An imperfect patent regime
provides commitment devices that facilitate an innovation network that
exploits commercially promising segments of the genetic information
stock. But a hidden social cost lurks behind the imposition of even this
partially conforms to an intuition advanced by Williamson that an efficient innovation
system might consist of a two-stage process, where small firms dominate the early
invention stage and their inventions are then acquired (either through licensing or
merger) by larger firms which undertake development and marketing. See WILLIAMSON,
supra note 10, at 205-06.
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weak form of patent protection. Granting patent entitlements may
generate not only allocative and distributive costs but, ultimately,
innovative costs in the form of depressed levels of fundamental
innovation. If a dominant firm or firms can assemble a broad patent
portfolio that effectively perfects the imperfect coverage of any
individual patent award, these firms may have reduced incentives to
negotiate interfirm alliances and enhanced incentives to block potential
entrants by refusing to license or imposing harsh licensing terms. These
anticompetitive practices may effectively institute a regime of perfect
patent protection that is likely to close off much of the genetic commons
to the small firms that have been the indispensable catalysts of most
fundamental innovation in the biotechnology sector.
There is an obvious role for antitrust regulators to play in this
dilemma. Regulators must walk a fine line between ensuring that large
firms do not assemble broad patent portfolios that stifle innovation
incentives and facilitating the formation of interfim ventures that spread
the cost and uncertainty of fundamental research. Current antitrust
policy aims to trace that fine line by pursuing two divergent policies.

On the one hand, Congress, the agencies, and the courts provide relaxed
antitrust treatment for research and production joint ventures. This
generous stance encourages holders of complementary patents, blocking
patents, or efficient distribution capacities to merge research,
development, production, or diffusion processes to spread the cost of
undertaking fundamental innovation. On the other hand, the FTC
recently has applied unconventional compulsory licensing and asset
divestiture remedies as an approval condition for several mergers in the
biopharmaceutical sector.'
If this licensing and divestiture threat
discourages some larger downstream firms from acquiring smaller,
upstream firms, it may maintain a widely diffused body of
biotechnological patent holdings and sustain entry opportunities in the
upstream R&D market.
A.

Why the Genetic Commons Needs Antitrust Scrutiny

This Article has shown that innovation networks in the biotechnology
sector rely on two reciprocal risk-distribution devices that allocate
product distribution and product development to two symbiotic markets.
Large firms tend to contract out basic research to an upstream market
populated by small start-ups and university departments, while the
upstream market tends to contract out product manufacture and diffusion
to large pharmaceutical firms in the downstream market. Although this
121.
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model generally describes the current structure of the biotechnology
market, the real world is slightly more complicated. Small firms
sometimes attempt to market and manufacture a product independently
to obtain the undivided profits on an R&D investment.'2 In particular,
small biotechnology firms that wish to siphon off a pharmaceutical
firm's market share in a particular disease market'3 may be more willing
to risk undertaking product diffusion independently to establish a brand
image and distribution relationships. Partly to counteract this entry
threat from the upstream market, large firms engage in a considerable
amount of internal biotechnology R&D and sometimes acquire upstream

input suppliers. Thus, both downstream and upstream participants face
the threat of entry through vertical integration and, in response, have
strong incentives to maintain substantial internal research/development
and marketing/manufacture capacities.
A plausible scenario, however, could upset this happy mix of
innovation incentives. If large downstream distributors expect that small
upstream suppliers may pose an entry threat in the downstream market,
even managers with short-term performance horizons may have
incentives to take aggressive counteractive measures. A dominant firm
may adopt a predation strategy' 24 that deters entry by inflating the
minimum level of R&D investment required for market penetration. To
do so, the dominant firm may choose to constrain monopoly profits and
overinvest in excess R&D capacity through the acquisition of patent
assets, research facilities, and star research personnel. This diversion of
cash flow to R&D activities, and the resulting short-term decline in
122. See LERNER & MERGES, supra note 74, at 17-18 (noting that small biotech
firms are reluctant to completely concede manufacturing rights to a larger sponsoring

firm and that many small firms are eager to develop marketing capabilities and thus often
seek "co-marketing" rights). Many small biotech firms often waver between integrating

downstream to market their therapeutic products independently or relying on an
established downstream distributor. See Abbott, supra note 72, at 46-47. This may
explain why pharmaceutical companies rarely are willing to grant "co-marketing" rights

in product development projects with small biotech firms. See id. at 50. Pharmaceutical
companies know that marketing is their comparative advantage and are not willing to
give away that know-how to biotech firms. See id.
123. "Disease market" refers to the consumer market for therapeutic products that
target a particular medical or psychiatric disorder or the diagnostic, surgical, or

therapeutic equipment that physicians and other clinical personnel use to treat a
particular disorder.
124. There is a large literature on predatory pricing and non-pricing strategies. For
a useful source on exclusionary practices generally and non-price predatory strategies in

particular, see generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price,96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
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monopolistic profits, may maximize long-term profits if the dominant
firm can successfully threaten small firms that it will be able to catch up
to and overtake quickly any new entrant.' To enhance the credibility of
the catch-up threat, the dominant firm may establish a track record of
awakening sleeping patents, or gearing up idle R&D capacities, by a
disproportionately aggressive reaction to the first firm that makes an
entry attempt.' 26 By incurring this one-time belligerence cost, the
dominant firm could reduce future expenditures on fundamental R&D
and discourage further entry attempts by maintaining an asset portfolio
of sleeping patents and semi-idle R&D facilities and defending that
intellectual property portfolio through aggressive litigation strategies.
But the dominant firm can select a far simpler and far more effective

strategy. Large, downstream firms could vertically integrate upstream
by acquiring small firms in the R&D input market and, as a result,
accumulating a patent portfolio that covers a broad prospect of
subsequent improvements. This strategy effectively overcomes the
imperfect scope of individual patent entitlements and obtains patent
interests in a wide range of innovation resources. As an alternative to a
collaborative venture with several smaller participants, a dominant
downstream firm may achieve roughly the same degree of risk
distribution and spillover internalization through a series of vertical
acquisitions. Financing pressures from venture capitalists, who may
want to cash out early, may give small firms strong incentives to accept
above-market takeover bids from downstream acquirors. Through an
aggressive litigation strategy that extends the effective scope of its patent
warehouse, combined with a refusal to license basic research tools to
potential upstream entrants on reasonable terms, a dominant downstream
firm may hoard core scientific resources and raise significant entry
barriers in the upstream R&D market.
Every corporate or intellectual asset acquisition by downstream firms
increases development costs for smaller upstream firms by increasing
the costs of inventing around the dominant firm's increasingly broader
patent portfolio. Even if there are multiple, noncolluding competitors in
the downstream market, the dominant firms' expanding patent portfolios
mean that there are fewer safe harbors where small firms can engage in
125. Dominant firms may have incentives to acquire but not exercise this expanded
intellectual property inventory if any new product innovations may substitute for some of
the firm's existing products and thus cannibalize existing sales. See Reinganum, supra
note 109, at 869 (arguing that monopolist firms have an incentive to deter entry that

would dissipate industry profits by acquiring patents and holding them as "sleeping
patents").
126. See Baker, supra note 93, at 635 (stating that a dominant firm may attempt to
deter actual entry by heavily investing in R&D, and to deter potential entry by setting a
strong precedent that it will defend its market share through heavy R&D investment).
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product development without fear of protracted and exorbitant
infringement litigation. 7 If a production cartel or monopoly exists in
the downstream market and no other markets offer, or reasonably
threaten to offer, close substitute products, matters are even worse. A
vertically integrating firm that has a monopoly in the downstream
market may impose harsh cross-licensing terms on smaller firms that
have developed innovation inputs and seek entry into the upstream or
downstream markets.' This dominant firm may exert monopsonistic

bargaining leverage in the input market, push down the price of
innovation inputs, and divert potential innovation suppliers to alternative
investment opportunities.
This is not a fantastic scenario, although it is certainly more likely if
there is a single downstream firm (which is not uncommon in many
disease markets). Several Supreme Court decisions hold that an
aggressive strategy of patent acquisition may be a means to obtain or
sustain dominant market share.'29 In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States,'30 the district court had found that the defendant, the leading U.S.
manufacturer of glass-making machinery, conspired with smaller glass
manufacturers to acquire thousands of patents to enforce cross-licensing
restrictions, production quotas, and territorial allocations that blocked
potential entrants.'
This large patent pool included numerous
127. See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & EcON.
463, 465 (1995) (showing that firms with high litigation costs are likely to patent in
research areas with relatively few other patent awards, and are even less likely to patent
in areas dominated by firms with low litigation costs).
128. This type of behavior is roughly what the FTC alleged in its recently settled
case against the Intel Corporation. See Intel Corporation: Analysis to Aid Public
Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 14, 246 (1999). The FTC alleged that Intel refused to provide
advance technical information concerning its microprocessors to computer retailers and
hardware developers who had patents that they were either trying to enforce against Intel
or were refusing to license royalty-free to Intel. See id. In the consent order, Intel is
prohibited from withholding certain advance technical information or assistance from
existing customers who were involved in an intellectual property dispute with Intel. See
id. at 14,247-48.
129. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175, 196-97 (1963)
(finding that cross-licensing agreement between two holders of mutually infringing
patents in various countries for sewing machine designs concealed violative conspiracy
to acquire broad patent portfolio so as to institute infringement litigation against the
remaining global competitor); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 422-23

(10th Cir. 1952) (finding that aggressive strategy of acquiring all patents for hydraulic
pumps for oil wells and instituting frivolous infringement litigation against new entrant
constituted a violative attempt to monopolize).
130. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
131. Seeid.at392.
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improvement patents that the defendants never exploited and acquired

solely to maintain control over the industry. 32 Hartford-Empiremay be

the patent law analogue to the Terminal Railroadcase,'33 where a group
of railroads acquired the central railroad terminal and bridge facilities in
the St. Louis area, and the court ordered that the controlling group admit
nonmembers to maintain competitive conditions.' 34 Similar concerns

about an innovation or access bottleneck 35 have motivated a number of

the FTC's recent biopharmaceutical merger decisions, which address the
possibility that reduced R&D incentives could result from a merger of

the only two firms that are seriously developing therapies for the same
disease market.'36
One obvious response to these decisions, and the prospect of upstream

vertical integration generally, is "so what?"
132.

If upstream vertical

See id. at 395. Although the Court agreed with the lower court's assertion of

the facts of the case, it considerably relaxed the district court's decree and ordered that
the defendants must: (1) license their currently patented glass-making machinery at a
reasonably royalty to any applicant, and (2) refrain from attaching restrictive territorial
or grant-back provisions to its license contracts in the glassware industry. See id. at 43435.
133. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
134. See id. at 383-85. For related "duty to engage" and "essential facilities" cases,
see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (finding
antitrust violation in refusal by owner of most skiing areas in Aspen area to participate in
multi-area lift ticket package with only other ski area); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (finding violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in electric
utility's refusal to sell wholesale power to competing municipal utilities); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152 (1951) (finding violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act in newspaper's refusal to sell advertising space to customers that had also
bought advertising from a new radio station that was the paper's main competitor);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375-76 (1927)
(finding attempt to monopolize in Kodak's refusal to sell wholesale products to a retailer
that Kodak previously had sought to acquire).
135. See generally William J. Baer, Antitrust Enforcement and High Technology
Markets (visited Dec. 3, 1998) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ipat6.htm> (noting
that "the networking effects present in many high tech industries can lead to a winnertake-all market with very limited opportunity for any firm to compete with the dominant
network").
136. There are several recent rulings that illustrate this claim. In Ciba-Geigy Ltd.,
the FTC expressed concern over the innovation incentives that would result from the
merger of two dominant developers of a single gene-therapy treatment, where the
merged firm would hold the patents to the two processes essential for conducting most
existing types of gene therapies. See Ciba-Geigy Ltd. et al.: Prohibited Trade Practices,
and Affirmative Corrective Actions, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,706 (1997). Similarly, in Glaxo,
the FTC claimed harm to innovation incentives where the merger transaction would
integrate the only two firms that had invested seriously in developing an oral drug to
treat migraine headaches. See Glaxo plc: Prohibited Trade Practices, and Affirmative
Corrective Actions, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,396 (1995). The FTC claimed that the merger
would allow Glaxo to unilaterally curtail R&D investment in this innovation project and

reduce the number of research tracks that firms were pursuing in this innovation market.
See id. Ultimately, the firms entered into a consent order requiring the divestiture of one
of the research projects to a competing third firm. See id.
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integration results in economies of scale in R&D activities and
monopsonistic buying power for the downstream supplier, it may push
down the price of upstream innovation inputs, and, depending on
competitive substitutes and demand elasticities in the downstream
market, the consumer retail price for downstream outputs. Thus, it
seems that certain vertical mergers in science-based markets may
enhance, rather than diminish, consumer welfare. These arguments
neglect to consider, however, the important distinction between
allocative and innovative efficiency and the correspondingly different
conceptions of consumer welfare." Allocatively, or statically, efficient
business combinations, which may push prices toward marginal cost and
thus enhance consumer welfare in the short term, may engender
innovative, or dynamic, inefficiencies that result in reduced fundamental
innovation and thus reduce consumer welfare over the long term. ' A
process of upstream vertical integration, and the accompanying
consolidation of patent portfolios, would perfect the current regime of
imperfect patent coverage and effectively institute a regime of prospectlike patent protection that is likely to injure the innovative fitness of the
biotechnology market. Patent-warehousing strategies threaten to
undermine the network model of collaborative innovation that favors
fundamental product development and set in its place the autarchic
model of corporate R&D that favors incremental innovation. That
would be an ironic result. Although the introduction of patent rights was
designed to correct private underinvestment in radical biotechnology
research, ultimately it could do little to remedy that problem or could
even exacerbate it.

137. On the distinction between allocative and innovative efficiency, see supra note
14. As Joseph Brodley notes, "consumer welfare" is one of the most commonly used

terms in antitrust decisions and commentary, but, curiously, lacks any precise or settled
definition. See Brodley, supra note 14, at 1020. Even if we equate consumer welfare
with maximizing social wealth through efficient market structures (rather than equating
consumer welfare with the redistributive goal of maximizing consumer surplus), we still
must decide whether we are concerned about maximizing short-term social wealth
(which points toward allocative efficiency) or long-term social wealth (which points
toward innovative and productive efficiencies). For more on this problem, see id. at
1032-36.
138. See KAMIEN & ScnwARTz, supra note 82, at 15 (stating that a dilemma "occurs
in the formulation and enforcement of our antitrust laws, because to the extent that these
laws are meant to achieve and maintain efficient allocation of resources in the short run,
they may tend to inhibit invention").

1039

B. Relaxed Treatment of Research and ProductionJoint Ventures
Although joint ventures'39 enable firms in high-technology markets to
engage in long-term and uncertain innovation projects, these
arrangements resemble horizontal agreements that traditionally trigger
considerable antitrust scrutiny for anticompetitive effects.'4° Even
upstream-downstream collaborations may fall under the horizontal
category, since upstream input suppliers commonly harbor ambitions of
forward integration and downstream distributors commonly harbor
ambitions of backward integration. The courts have long viewed with
suspicion information-sharing, patent and copyright licensing, and
patent-pooling mechanisms that may allow horizontal competitors to
mask cartel-like collusion over price or output or to erect an entry barrier
to nonparticipants who cannot replicate the joint venture's efficient cost
structure.'4 ' This antitrust bias against collaboration among holders of
complementary intellectual property assets historically has posed a
significant obstacle to the formation of efficiency-enhancing R&D
alliances.'42
Sound analysis of interfirm collaboration must consider that, although
the restricted access character of a joint venture erects an entry barrier, it
may be an essential prerequisite to the venture's welfare-enhancing
production and research efficiencies.143 Because science-based markets
139. The Antitrust Division defines a joint venture as "essentially any collaborative
effort among firms, short of a merger, with respect to R&D, production, distribution,
and/or the marketing of products or services."

Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for

hternationalOperations,4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,109, at 20,599 (1988).

140. For a current discussion of antitrust treatment of joint ventures, see Joseph F.
Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1521 (1981-1982);

Howard H. Chang et al., Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy

Towards Joint Ventures, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223; Joseph Kattan, Antitrust
Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Rewards of
Innovation, 61 ANTMrUST L.J. 937 (1992); Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of

Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTrrRUSTL.J. 701 (1997).

141. In the intellectual property context, the Court has swung back and forth on the
degree to which synergistic efficiencies may be considered in assessing the
anticompetitive effects of patent pooling arrangements. Compare Bement v. Nat'l
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (exempting from antitrust scrutiny a pooling
arrangement that effectively amounted to price-fixing), with United States v. Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (finding antitrust violation in agreement to pool
blocking patents on ground that it masked price-fixing restraint), and United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (finding that cross-license agreement was part of
broader combination to exclude potential entrants).
142. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 104, at 75.
143.

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joitt Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995

COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 7 (stating "[t]he difficult problem for antitrust policy is that the
very same exclusions that facilitate anticompetitive behavior may have been essential to
create the incentives to form the joint venture in the first place"). See also Carl Shapiro
& Robert D. Willig, On the Antitrust Treatment of ProductionJoint Ventures, 4 J. ECON.
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depend heavily on basic-research investments, they have a special need
for vertical and horizontal joint ventures that spread the direct costs of
early product development and the indirect costs of inappropriable
knowledge spillovers.' 44 If patent protection is imperfect and does not
cover most of the expected spillovers of fundamental research, an
innovating firm can only expect to recover a good deal of those
spillovers by partnering with firms that have complementary intellectual
assets or distribution capacities. For this reason, the private sector may
be slow to develop certain product innovations in the absence of joint

ventures and other collaborative opportunities. 145 Additionally, antitrust
concerns about output restraints are not very compelling with respect to
joint ventures that are confined to research activities, since it would be
unusually difficult for research collaborators to commit to and enforce
146
collusive agreements to restrain each participant's product output.
Recognizing these considerations, Congress, antitrust agencies, and
the courts have relaxed antitrust scrutiny for research and production

joint ventures in high-technology markets. In 1984 Congress passed the
National Cooperative Research Act

47

("NCRA"), which offers special

113, 116 (1990) (stating that research joint ventures may result in cost-saving
efficiencies that outweigh any anticompetitive welfare losses).
144. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 104, at 78 (stating that "much innovation today
is likely to require lateral and horizontal linkages" and that "[i]f innovating firms do not
have the necessary capabilities in-house, they may need to engage in various forms of
restrictive contracts with providers of inputs and complementary assets").
145. See Werden, supranote 140, at 702.
146. Some writers argue that confining collaboration to the research stage does not
rule out price-fixing, since the joint venture could transfer research outputs to the
participating firms at elevated prices, and then each firm could pass on the costs to
consumers. See Shapiro & Willig, supra note 143, at 115. This argument is only
compelling, however, if the research cartel is able to prevent cheating at the distribution
and manufacturing stage. The cartel can only do so if the cartel participants are
concerned about reputational effects, and sufficiently value further collaboration in the
future. If short-term gains exceed long-term reputational harm, however, each cartel
participant can undercut other participants once it obtains the know-how to manufacture
the product independently. If this is true, then all cartel members charge competitive
prices and the antitrust authorities have little to worry about.
147. 15 U.S.C § 4302 (1994). For joint ventures that register with the Department of
Justice, the Act reduces antitrust penalties to single damages and offers a more favorable
attorneys' fee provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1994). The Act also requires courts to
PERSP.

apply rule-of-reason analysis to R&D joint ventures and forbids the application of per se
rules of illegality. See 15 U.S.C. § 4302. Empirical studies are mixed as to whether the
Act has stimulated a substantially higher number of newly formed research ventures.
See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Law andInnovation Cooperation,4 J. ECON. PERSP. 97,

99 (1990) (observing that the Act has stimulated the formation of research joint ventures
but noting single study showing that, during an 18-month period, joint ventures
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treatment to registered research joint ventures, and in 1993 it enacted the
National Cooperative Research and Production Act,'48 which extends
relief granted under the NCRA to registered production joint ventures.
Following Congress's lead, the agencies and the courts recently have
accorded significant leeway to horizontal innovation agreements. The
antitrust agencies have stated that they will consider whether licensing
terms that are likely to have an anticompetitive effect are "reasonably
'
In its most recent
necessary to achieve procompetitive efficiencies."149
observed that
Division
Antitrust
the
statement in this area, the FTC and

most R&D competitor collaborations are procompetitive. 50 The courts

have adopted a similarly generous approach. The widely criticized
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Topco Associates M applying

a rule of per se illegality to a territorial restraint imposed by a joint
venture that lacked dominant market share, has never been explicitly
overruled. However, the Court's later decision in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society,'52 as well as numerous lower courts' decisions,
suggest that the per se rule no longer applies to joint ventures that
demonstrate significant degrees of economic integration and exhibit

plausible welfare-enhancing effects.'
registered under the Act tended to operate in industries without serious appropriability
problems); Jorde & Teece, supra note 104, at 87 (arguing that filings indicate that most
firms that registered under the Act between 1984 and 1988 were modest endeavors and
are "not of great competitive moment").
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306 (1994).
149. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at § 4.2. The Guidelines
state:
If the Agencies conclude that the restraint has, or is likely to have, an
anticompetitive effect, they will consider whether the restraint is reasonably
necessary to achieve procompetitive efficiencies. If the restraint is reasonably
necessary, the Agencies will balance the procompetitive efficiencies and the
anticompetitive effects to determine the probable net effect on competition in
each relevant market.
Id. It is important to note that numerous restraints imposed in joint ventures, such as
exclusive distribution territories, may prevent members from appropriating a
disproportionate share of the revenues and thus encourage participation in the
collaborative arrangement. See Werden, supra note 140, at 707.
150. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 14-15 (2000) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS].

151. 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). For a review of the central arguments often offered
against that decision, see Werden, supra note 140, at 709-11.
152. 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982) (holding that agreements among seventy percent of
area physicians to adhere to maximum fee schedule were per se violations of Section 1
of the Sherman Act, but stating that the arrangement was not a joint venture because it
did not pool capital and investment uncertainty).
153. See id. at 356-57 (stating "[t]he foundations are not analogous to partnerships
or other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool

their capital and share the risk of loss"). See also Werden, supra note 140, at 713
(reviewing current case law and concluding that "[a]ny genuine economic integration
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C. Compulsory Licensing and Innovative Efficiency
A survey of current antitrust treatment of joint ventures suggests a

happy story in which federal agencies have given adequate leeway for
biotechnology firms to design interfirm arrangements that spread the
costs of researching and developing the genetic terrain. This rosy

picture is complicated, however, by the fact that the biotechnological
sector in the 1990s has exhibited not only a high incidence of joint
venture activity, but also a strong trend toward consolidation among

firms in the downstream sector along with some incidence of upstream
vertical acquisitions.' 4 This latter phenomenon is worrisome since
mergers, unlike joint ventures, consolidate patent portfolios of a range of
fundamental innovations and, consequently, may slow down the pace of

technological advance by erecting barriers to potential entrants and
depressing the merged firms' incentives to innovate. Although interfirm
collaboration with partial resource integration (joint ventures) generally
facilitates radical innovation, there is reason to believe that interfirm
collaboration with complete resource integration (mergers) will
generally harm radical innovation. Antitrust authorities have not
neglected this danger. In several merger decisions, they have employed

that plausibly could confer nontrivial social benefits suffices to take a joint venture
outside the purview of the per se rules applied to cartel activity"). This is not to say that

research and production collaboration will not trigger some antitrust scrutiny. The
agencies and the courts are not willing to extend relaxed treatment to collaborative
agreements that result in supracompetitive prices, do not combine complementary inputs,
do not pool investment uncertainty, or are not accompanied by significant production or
research efficiencies. In Summit Technology, a 1998 administrative ruling, the FTC
found that a patent pool between the only two FDA-approved manufacturers of lasers for
treating certain vision disorders used an ad valorem (i.e., per unit) licensing fee
effectively to set a price floor. See VISX, Inc. et al., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,25455. See also Summit Technologies, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,490, at 24,336
(1999). The Commission found that the horizontal restraint (and, in particular, the
effective price floor) was not reasonably tailored to any expected efficiency
enhancement, since each competitor had sufficient intellectual property assets and capital
resources to enter the market as independent competitors. See id. at 24,337. Thus, the
most recent case law and administrative rulings indicate that industry participants in
collaborative ventures have wide, but not unlimited, leeway to enter into arrangements
that show significant degrees of economic integration. See also GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS, supra note 150, at 14 (noting that R&D joint ventures typically are
analyzed under the rule of reason).
154. See ACHARYA, supra note 4, at 22-26. Although there were a number of
vertical acquisitions of biotechnology firms by pharmaceuticals in the early 1990s, this

trend has slowed and strategic alliances between upstream and downstream firms remain
a far more frequent pattern of R&D acquisition for pharmaceutical firms. See id. at 22.
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fairly burdensome divestiture and compulsory licensing remedies that
may facilitate a wide diffusion of privately and publicly generated
scientific knowledge.
There is an obvious argument that compulsory licensing may
undermine the innovation incentives generated by the introduction of
patent rights. If prospective patentees expect that compulsory licensing
will probably suspend or curtail a patent monopoly, they may shift
resources to other investment opportunities or choose not to patent and
expend resources on maintaining secrecy over any product innovations.
But these arguments view patents primarily as monopoly rewards that
supply incentives for private innovation. In the biotechnology sector,
this argument has decidedly mixed support. If biotechnology patents
operate primarily as commitment devices that reduce the transaction
costs of negotiating long-term contractual commitments, there are far
less compelling grounds to fear that compulsory licensing will lead to
diminished investment in risky innovation activities. Relying on this
transaction-cost rationale for patent protection, this Article argues that
the FTC's judicious application of compulsory licensing in merger
enforcement will do little to discourage private investment in innovation,
probably encourages participation in coliaborative ventures, and may
foreclose an undesirable regime of "perfected" patent protection.
1.

Innovation Markets and the Mini-Revival
of Compulsory Licensing

In issuing compulsory-licensing remedies in science-based markets,
the FTC relies on the novel innovation market approach to merger
analysis.'55 The FTC employs this approach in executing its merger
enforcement duties under three statutory provisions: Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 6 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 157 and Section 5 of the
155. This method of analysis is presented in the 1995 Federal Antitrust Intellectual
Property Guidelines. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at §§
3.2.2, 3.2.3. The Guidelines define an innovation market as "the research and
development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, and the
substitutes for that research and development." Id. at § 3.2.3. For a general presentation
of the innovation market concept by two former Department of Justice staff members
who originally conceived this approach, see Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine,
hIcorporatingDynamic Efficiency Concerns in MergerAnalysis: The Use of Innovation
Markets, 63 ANTrrRUST L.J. 569 (1994). For a review of some of the FTC's recent

applications of the innovation market concept in merger enforcement, see Andrew Chin,

Analyzing Mergers in Innovation Markets, 38 JuRIMETRics J. 119 (1998); Thomas N.
Dahdouh & James F. Mongoven, The Shape of Things to Come: Innovation Market
Analysis in Merger Cases, 64 ANTTRrJSTL.J. 405 (1995).

156.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 1 claims challenge mergers or practices that

constitute a "contract, combination.., or conspiracy in restraint of trade." Id.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Section 18 claims challenge mergers
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Federal Trade Commission Act."'

The conventional market power

approach to merger enforcement assesses whether the merged firm has
the ability to sustain supracompetitive pricing or unilateral output
restraints in a consumer goods market.5I 9 By contrast, the FTC's novel
approach to high-technology mergers assesses: (1) whether the merged
finm will be able unilaterally to restrain output in an upstream R&D
market, and (2) whether that output restraint will result in competitive
injury to the downstream products market 6° This approach defines the
R&D market in terms of either licensed intellectual property assets or
R&D capacities to develop and manufacture certain high-technology
products.
Just like conventional horizontal merger analysis under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the innovation market approach proceeds
by identifying the size of the relevant market and then measuring the
pre-merger and post-merger levels of concentration in that market. If the
merger significantly increases concentration in the relevant R&D
market, the enforcement agency addresses whether there are
procompetitive efficiencies that may result from this presumptively
violative business combination and, if so, whether those procompetitive
efficiencies outweigh any anticompetitive effects.
The innovation market approach allows antitrust authorities to assess
whether a proposed merger will reduce or enhance incentives for the
merged firms unilaterally to restrain innovative output, with a resulting
downstream welfare effect in a consumer products market. In an
innovation market, where firms require access to certain patented
technologies to develop substitute products, an incumbent firm can erect
entry barriers by acquiring a competitor's extensive patent portfolio and
either refusing to license or dictating harsh licensing terms. If these
barriers lock out most potential entrants, then the incumbent firm may be
able unilaterally to reduce innovation output. Furthermore, if entry
or business "in any line of commerce... in any section of the country" whose combined

effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). Section 45 claims challenge mergers or practices that
constitute "unfair methods of competition." Id.
159. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 1-2 (1992 & Revised 1997).

160. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GuIDELINEs, supra note 11 at § 3.2.3. The
notion of an R&D market made its first official appearance in 1984 in the language of
the NCRA, which directs courts to review antitrust complaints against certain joint
ventures for their "effects on competition in properly defined, relevant research,
development, product, process, and service markets." 15 U.S.C § 4302 (1994).
161. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at §§ 3.2.2, 3.2.3.
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relies on a substantial sunk-cost investment in project-specific R&D
facilities and personnel, a firm may deter entry or compel withdrawal by
acquiring a competitor's research assets and human capital. Highly

specialized research personnel may be scarce in industries where firms
acquire R&D cost efficiencies through "learning by doing" and where
project-specific know-how is difficult to communicate to inexperienced

personnel.'62
It may appear that the agencies' application of the innovation market
approach departs from conventional market power analysis only insofar
as it examines a market for potential rather than existing products. This
is why some commentators argue that it is not a necessary addition to the
enforcement repertoire.'63 These critics argue that, in most cases where

the FTC has applied the innovation market approach, it could have
reached the same result under a conventional analysis of the incumbent's
ability unilaterally to restrain output in the product market."'
Furthermore, in the few cases where the FTC applied the innovation

market approach and classical market power analysis would not have
reached the same result, it is likely that the FTC wrongly targeted an
efficient business combination. This latter criticism has two possible
versions. First, these critics argue that the innovation market analysis
unjustifiably assumes that market concentration is likely to result in
reduced R&D output."5 Second, and more crucially, these critics argue
that the FTC misapplies the innovation market approach to business
combinations that are likely to reduce R&D expenditures but are
unlikely to result in supracompetitive pricing in the consumer products

market. Although these mergers may result in a lower rate of innovative
162. See Teece, supra note 66, at 196 (stating that "technology transfer is often
difficult without the transfer of key individuals" and that "the diffusion of new
technology often depends on the mobility of engineers and scientists").
163. See George A. Hay, Innovations in Antitrust Enforcement, 64 ANTrrRuST L.J. 7
(1995); Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles?, 64
ANTrrRUST L.J. 49 (1995); Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation
Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 AN'rrRuST L.J. 19 (1995). For a reply to

critics of the innovation market approach, see Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C.Sunshine,
The Use of Innovation Markets: A Reply to Hay, Rapp, and Hoerner, 64 ANTITUST L.J.
75, 77-78 (1995) (recognizing that there is no incontrovertible evidence showing that
innovative activity declines as R&D concentration increases, but arguing that the
innovation market approach is legally tractable in certain business situations and
captures a welfare loss from certain mergers that traditional market power analysis
would overlook).
164. See Rapp, supra note 163, at 19-20.
165. See id. at 20. This argument relies principally on the assertion that economic
analysis has not demonstrated any reliable or predictable relationship between market
concentration and R&D output, R&D output and innovative success, and R&D
expenditures and future output prices. For a rebuttal of this argument, see Gilbert &
Sunshine, supra note 163, at 77-80.
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output in the upstream market, they are unlikely to result in
supracompetitive pricing in the downstream market, and thus do not
trigger the type of welfare loss covered by the antitrust laws.' 66
These critics are absolutely right that the innovation market approach
sometimes may largely overlap with the conventional analysis of
consumer injury in terms of output restraints or supracompetitive
pricing. These critics are also right in asserting that the agencies have
not limited the innovation market approach to testing indirectly whether
a merger may trigger competitive injuries in the downstream market. In
those instances where the innovation market approach reaches a result
that does not track the market power approach, the FTC appears to be
implicitly relying on an alternative definition of competitive injury in

terms of innovative, rather than allocative, efficiencies. 67 Under this
alternative definition, competitive injury may result from business

combinations that reduce the merged firms' incentives to sustain current
R&D expenditures, or certain types of R&D expenditures, even if they

do not enable the merged firms to engage in supracompetitive pricing of
consumer goods."" Proponents of the innovation market approach insist
that it is limited, by definition, to R&D output distortions that are likely
to generate supracompetitive pricing in the downstream market. 9
Several recent FTC applications

of this approach in the bio-

pharmaceutical sector, however, address innovative output distortions
that plausibly could only affect the variety and quality, rather than the

pricing and quantity, of consumer goods in the downstream market.7

166. See Hoemer, supra note 163, at 49-51 (arguing that the type of market
behavior that the innovation market approach targets is not cognizable under Section 7 of

the Clayton Act).
167. On the distinction between innovative and allocative efficiencies, see supra
note 14.
168. See generally COMPETITION POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 1 (Executive
Summary & Principal Conclusions) (noting that "in many markets, the basis for
competition today includes not only the price at which a product is sold but the
ingenuity, variety, and speed of development of new goods and services" and that
"innovation contributes powerfully to our economy... generally more so than do cost
savings gleaned in existing ways of doing business").
169. See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 163, at 80.
170. The FTC's pattern of application finds some textual support in the Intellectual
Property Guidelines, which state that innovation market analysis may be necessary to
determine whether licensing arrangements (and, presumably, all dispositions) with
respect to intellectual property "are likely to affect adversely the prices, quantities,
qualities, or varieties of goods and services either currently or potentially available."
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINEs, supra note 11, at § 3.2 (emphasis added). See
also GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS, supra note 150, at § 3.3 (stating that exercise of
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These rulings primarily exhibit qualitative concerns with the effect of
patent consolidation on the diversity of technological inputs or the
diffusion of intellectual property holdings. These rulings rarely express
quantitative concerns that the merged firm's dominant share in the
upstream market will lead to supracompetitive pricing in the
downstream market.
Although this structural application of the innovation market approach
may appear unorthodox, it conforms closely to a trend in antitrust
scholarship that emphasizes that antitrust enforcement should advance
not only the goal of allocative efficiency but also, and even primarily,
the goal of innovative efficiency.'
Whereas allocative efficiency is
concerned with setting prices equal to marginal cost in the consumer
products market, innovative efficiency is concerned with ensuring that
firms invest in R&D projects that maximize social wealth over the long
term.' There is a strong basis for favoring innovative efficiency over
allocative efficiency, since economic evidence shows that retarded
innovation almost certainly injures aggregate social wealth far more than
the deadweight loss from supracompetitive pricing.'
Understanding
market efficiency in innovative terms would result in a relaxation of
antitrust concerns in some areas and an intensification of antitrust
scrutiny in other areas. Thus, antitrust enforcement may be unjustified if
it targets firms that enter into horizontal agreements that promote

innovation efficiencies even if these agreements may result in
allocatively inefficient pricing practices.

This proposition obviously

supplies a strong basis for the agencies' relaxed scrutiny for research
joint ventures. Conversely, antitrust enforcement may be justified as a
means of precluding market structures that threaten innovation
efficiencies, even if the targeted parties are engaging in allocatively
efficient market practices. This approach enables antitrust authorities to
target a merger that is likely to result in reduced R&D output or a
misallocation of R&D resources toward incremental, rather than
fundamental, innovation but is unlikely to have any supracompetitive
effect in the downstream market.
This broadened understanding of the innovation market approach
market power by R&D joint venture may injure consumers by leading to lower
innovation levels, fewer products for consumers, and lower quality products).
171. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 14, at 1032-36; John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy,
Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of Technology, 66

ANTTRUST

L.J. 487,

493-97 (1998); Scherer, supra note 14, at 998-1002.
172. See Brodley, supra note 14, at 1032-33. See also Flynn, supra note 171, at 508
(stating that "[slome mergers and acquisitions that might not otherwise be challenged
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act can become questionable when viewed in light of
innovation efficiencies").
173. See Brodley, supra note 14, at 1025-26; Scherer, supra note 14, at 1001-02.
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supplies the strongest theoretical basis for much of the FTC's recent
scrutiny of biopharmaceutical mergers. Even if it were true that the
innovation market approach has little added value under a conventional
analysis of unilateral constraints on product output, it has significant
added value under a less conventional concern with unilateral constraints
on the rate or direction of R&D output. A structural concern with the
innovative vigor of science-based markets best explains several recent
FTC consent decrees that conditioned approval of mergers between large
pharmaceutical firms on either divestiture or licensing of some of the
firms' intellectual property assets.'74 Although compulsory licensing has
been an uncommon remedy in U.S. antitrust enforcement since the
1970s,'75 it serves to break up growing patent portfolios that threaten to
174. A non-exhaustive list of these consent decrees includes the following
representative cases. In In re Baxter Int'l Inc., 123 F.T.C. 904 (1997), the FTC
conditioned approval of a merger between Baxter, a large pharmaceutical manufacturer,
and Immuno International AG, an upstream biotechnology firm, on the licensing of a
chemical agent (in development) for controlling bleeding in surgical procedures and
divestiture to an FrC-approved buyer of one of only two existing technologies (the other
being owned by Immuno) for certain hemophilia treatments. See id. at 910-12, 921. In
In re Upjohn Co., 121 F.T.C. 44 (1996), the FTC examined a merger in which neither
company had FDA-approved, marketable assets, but both companies were far ahead of
the few other companies that were developing drugs for colorectal cancer. See id. at 46.
The settlement order required the acquired firm to divest some of its intellectual property

assets. See id. at 50. In In re Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 119 F.T.C. 344 (1995), the FTC
examined a merger between Wright, the leading current manufacturer of orthopedic
finger implants, and Orthomet, a firm that was developing finger implants, on the ground
that the acquisition would reduce competition in the market for existing and potential
finger-implants products. See id. at 346-47. Ultimately, the FTC issued a consent order
prohibiting Wright for 10 years from acquiring any firm that conducts or intends to
conduct R&D regarding finger-implant products. See id. at 354.
175. See Scherer, supra note 14, at 1017. The antitrust authorities and federal
courts used compulsory licensing extensively during the 1940s and 1950s. See id. From
1941 to 1959, 107 antitrust settlements included a compulsory licensing order, and
together these settlements covered an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 patents. See id. In the
most noticeable instance, IBM and AT&T entered judgments requiring the licensing of
more than 9,000 patents (usually without any royalty). See id. In the most recent, wellknown instance, the FTC used the compulsory licensing remedy in a 1975 consent
decree that ordered the Xerox Corporation to open up its portfolio of copying machine
patents for licensing at a capped royalty rate. See In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 374
(1975). That decree, however, established a weak precedent, since the FTC's next
attempt at requiring licensing did not meet with success. In 1977, the FTC charged that
the DuPont Corporation had engaged in predatory underpricing of a chemical product by
exploiting its cost advantage as a result of a process it had developed and patented. See
In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980). The agency asked for
divestiture of two company plants and royalty-free licensing of the technology. On
appeal, however, an administrative law judge issued an order to dismiss. See id. at 65556, 751.
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erect entry barriers, constrain the diffusion of intellectual property
assets, and injure technological diversity within a particular innovative
field. 76 The FTC occasionally has determined that licensing could not
assure competitive conditions and has ordered that the acquiring firm or
acquired firm divest itself of certain technologies.' In some instances,
the FTC has even required the merged firm to supply the recipient of the
technical assistance from
divested or licensed technologies with
7
personnel who developed the technology. 1
All the biopharmaceutical mergers that the FTC has targeted under
this approach since 1990 have involved firms which had formerly been
the few competitors that were progressing seriously toward developing a
therapeutic innovation for a particular disease market. In conventional
market power terms, the merged firms were the dominant actors in a
particular market for innovation goods. In all these rulings, the FTC
evidenced a structural concern with the long-term innovative fitness of
the relevant market, the continuation of the target firm's or acquiror
176. Although these licensing remedies generally do not provide for a royalty, the
consent order usually restricts the FTC-designated licensee to using the licensed
technology to continue the development project initiated by one of the merged firms. A
good example of this nuanced approach is the 1995 American Home Products Corp.
ruling. See In re American Home Prods. Corp., 119 F.T.C. 217 (1995). This ruling
concerned a merger of two of only three competitors in the R&D market for
development of a rotavirus vaccine. Reflecting concerns about the diversity of research
inputs, the FTC imposed a restricted-use, royalty-free licensing remedy partly on the
ground that the acquired firm employed a research route different from that of the
acquiring firm and the single remaining competitor in the relevant disease market. See
id. at 226.
177. To the author's knowledge, the first instance of this sort of remedy in the
biotechnology sector was In re Roche HoldingsLtd., 113 F.T.C. 1086 (1990). The FTC
opposed the acquisition by Roche, a large pharmaceutical firm, of a controlling interest
in Genentech, an established biotechnology firm. See id. at 1086. It alleged that the
acquisition would lessen competition in the research, development, production, and
marketing of vitamin C, human growth hormone, and certain CD4-based AIDS and HIV
treatments. See id. At the time of the challenge: (1) Roche manufactured vitamin C,
while Genentech had developed a new patented process for producing vitamin C but had
not yet done so; (2) Genentech had a human growth hormone on the market, and Roche
had a competing product in clinical trials; and (3) both firms were researching the same
type of AIDS/HIV treatments, but neither had a product approved for sale. See id. at
1081-86. The consent decree required divestiture of Genentech's vitamin C interests and
Roche's human growth-hormone businesses, including both existing technology and
R&D assets. See id. at 1093-95.
178. See, e.g., In re Roche Holdings, Ltd., File No. 971-0103 (F.T.C. 1998),
available at Agreement ContainingConsent Order (visited Oct. 2, 2000) <http:lwww.
flc.gov/os/1998/9802/9710103.agr.htm> (ordering that the acquired firm divest
intellectual property assets related to cardiac thrombolytic agents, a market in which it is
one of only a few competitors, and provide technical assets to the FTC-designated
recipient of the assets); In re Glaxo PLC, 119 F.T.C. 815, 820-21 (1995) (requiring
Glaxo to divest some of Wellcome's intellectual assets and then provide information,
technical assistance, and advice to the recipient of those assets, including consultation
with and training by Glaxo employees familiar with the project).
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firm's parallel research efforts, and potential entrants' access to at least a
portion of the merged firms' patent portfolio. The best example is the
FC's Ciba-Geigy ruling.' 79 The merged firms were two global
competitors that were among only a few firms engaged substantially in
the development of gene therapies for a variety of disorders. The FTC
expressed concern that the merged firm would relax innovative intensity
in these disease markets and, most crucially, that it would hold a patent
portfolio that consolidated the intellectual property rights to one of the
two major techniques (the ex vivo process) for conducting gene
therapy. 80 The FTC stated that this astonishingly broad patent portfolio
could enable the merged firm to erect significant entry barriers to the
gene therapy market, impose harsh licensing terms, refuse to license its
patented technologies, or unilaterally reduce its R&D expenditures in the
gene therapy market. 8 ' To remedy this threat to the innovative
efficiency of the gene therapy market, the FTC required that the merged
firm grant a nonexclusive license to certain patented technologies that
were deemed essential for subsequent research in this innovation

market. 182
2.

Why Compulsory Licensing Can Sustain Innovation

The threat of compulsory licensing means that firms may invest
substantial resources in an innovation project and then generate large
knowledge giveaways through a royalty-free license that antitrust
authorities grant to actual or potential rivals. As this scenario suggests,
179. See In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 1996 WL 743359.
180. See id. The Commission stated that the merged firms "control crucial inputs
into the development of gene therapy products and the merger creates an unmatchable
portfolio of intellectual property assets that are necessary to commercialize gene therapy
products." Id. Furthermore, it found that the "combination changes the competitive
incentives of the merged entity" and that "[ilt will likely lead to a reduction in
development of gene therapy products, as the parties combine their research and
development pipelines and eliminate or slow down their parallel development projects."
Id.
181. See id. The Commission stated that, although several other companies are
capable of conducting gene therapy research, "[w]ithout licenses to crucial intellectual
property held by [the merged firms] ... these other researchers would not be likely to
continue development." Id. Additionally, the Commission concluded that, due to the
breadth of the merged firm's consolidated portfolio, the firm "will have a disincentive to
license intellectual property rights to or collaborate with other companies as compared to
the pre-merger incentives of the independent competitors .. "
182. See id. The FTC ordered that the merged firm could receive sales-based
royalties on some of these compulsorily licensed technologies.
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it appears that compulsory licensing reintroduces, to some extent, the
first-mover disadvantage and counteracts the incentive-correcting
function of the patent system. Several commentators have raised these
incentive-reducing concerns with regard to the widely criticized
"essential facilities" doctrine' and argued that ordering a dominant firm
to share certain assets with competitors may discourage firms from
developing these welfare-enhancing facilities in the first place.'8 In the
pharmaceutical industry, it appears plausible that compulsory licensing
could lead some firms to reduce their anticipated flow of knowledge
giveaways by reducing total investment in R&D or favoring incremental
R&D that reveals few additional applications. Although these very
sensible arguments often cast considerable doubt on specific instances of
compulsory access remedies,'85 they do not offer a compelling case
against the FTC's surgical use of compulsory licensing in the
biopharmaceutical sector.
Even though compulsory licensing of essential patented technologies
may appear to reduce firms' expected return on certain fundamental
R&D projects, there is good reason to believe that it may not lead to any
reduction in corporate investments in these high-risk innovation

projects.

6

To the contrary, this regulatory device may sustain current

levels of fundamental innovation by encouraging large firms to acquire
R&D assets though collaborative ventures rather than upstream
acquisitions. This is because large firms can avoid the expected
knowledge giveaways as a result of compulsory licensing by favoring
strategic alliances that diffuse patent holdings over mergers that
Thus, the FTC's surgical use of
concentrate patent holdings.
compulsory licensing complements an imperfect patent regime and
sustains private incentives to conduct fundamental innovation through
network forms of organization. Just as incomplete patents encourage
183. For an excellent review of the case law applying the essential facilities and
related duty to deal doctrines, see James C. Burling et al., The Antitrust Duty to Deal and
IntellectualProperty Rights, 24 J. CoRp. L. 527 (1999). For a list of some of the leading
cases, see supra note 134.
184. On the incentive costs imposed by wide application of the essential facilities
doctrine, see Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles,58 ANTrrRUSTL.J. 841, 851 (1990).

185. For a list of some especially questionable requests for and judicial grants of
compulsory access remedies, see id. at 843-47.
186. Incidentally, the only significant study (to the author's knowledge) to measure
the economic effects of compulsory licensing found no support for the incentivereducing hypothesis. See F.M. SCHERER, THE EcONOMIc EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY
PATENT LICENSING (1977). Scherer found no support for the hypothesis that 44
companies operating under significant compulsory licensing decrees spent less on R&D
per dollar of sales than 635 companies not operating under such decrees. See id. at 67-

75.
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patent holders to construct interfirm networks that internalize otherwise
inappropriable spillovers of fundamental innovation projects, the threat
of compulsory licensing encourages large firms to prefer collaborative
ventures over vertical acquisition as a means of achieving that objective.
We know that large-firm managers already have strong incentives to do
so, given the adverse cash-flow effect of large-firm R&D investments
and the organizational incompetencies of bureaucratized research
environments. Compulsory licensing supplies an additional incentive,
since any high-growth or dominant firm that anticipates future mergers
may want to avoid exclusive ownership of a high-technology product
that lacks any close substitutes. Thus, large-firm managers may prefer
to enhance spillover internalization through interfirm collaborations
rather than vertical acquisitions or internal R&D investments.
Phillip Areeda argues that courts should order compulsory access only
if a single firm's facility is "both critical to the plaintiff's competitive
vitality and the plaintiff is essential for competition in the
marketplace."' Biopharmaceutical mergers are likely to satisfy both of
these conditions. Certain intellectual assets may close off a broad
prospect of subsequent applications and dominant-firm managers often
require the stimulus of a credible entry threat to maintain at least
moderate levels of R&D intensity. The threat of compulsory licensing
may discourage downstream firms from pursuing upstream vertical
acquisition strategies that harm the long-term innovative fitness of the
relevant disease market. These acquisition strategies would likely result
in a science-based market dominated by a few large competitors that
would wield sweeping patent portfolios and might exert sufficient
market power unilaterally to slow down the rate of fundamental
innovation. By disaggregating the patent portfolios of merged firms,
licensing and divestiture remedies ensure that small firms have access to
the basic tools for successful entry into certain disease markets. At the
same time, this persistent entry threat sustains large firms' incentives to
maintain innovative readiness and to seek R&D partners in the upstream
inputs market.
The FTC's concern with long-term innovative fitness, and the
187. Areeda, supra note 184, at 852. For an example of a court ruling that imposes
a duty to deal when a monopolist's essential facility is not easily duplicated, see MCI
Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that AT&T
obstructed MCI's connection to local telephone exchanges and thus impeded competitive
conditions in the long-distance market, contrary to the federal government's deregulation
policies in the telecommunications market).
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resulting application of licensing and divestiture remedies to patent
These
consolidation practices, has a distinctly structural aspect.
remedies may preserve the bifurcated industry structure of a
downstream, largely routinized innovation regime, and an upstream,
largely entrepreneurial innovation regime. This network model of
innovation relies on a symbiosis between small-scale operations that
breed breakthrough technologies and large firms that exhibit economies
of scale in clinical testing, manufacture, and distribution. Licensing
remedies sustain the innovative vitality of the upstream market by
occasionally compelling dominant firms to disseminate fundamental
research tools that actual or potential entrants require to compete for
market share and cannot replicate independently at a reasonable cost. At
the same time, licensing remedies either do not affect, or may even
enhance, incentives for downstream firms to maintain distribution
capacities and participate in interfirm alliances to develop new product
innovations. This distribution capacity is important because it
encourages small firms to incur the up-front costs of product
development and enables these cash-starved firms, including new

entrants, to obtain outside financing. Finally, sustaining competitive
conditions in the upstream market preserves the threat of forward
vertical integration, and thus encourages downstream firms to engage
independently in substantial amounts of fundamental innovation.
V. CONCLUSION

Current innovation policies in the biopharmaceutical sector consist of
substantial cash transfers to university research, imperfect forms of
patent protection, weak enforcement of the antitrust laws against
research and production joint ventures, and occasional use of
compulsory licensing and asset divestiture in merger approvals. In
science-based industries, there is a strong argument for an antitrust
enforcement strategy that periodically breaks up consolidated patent
portfolios that are likely to stifle technological advance. Licensing and
divestiture remedies may preclude upstream vertical integration
strategies that would upset the happy mix of incentives that explains
biotechnology's current success in cultivating, and maintaining access
to, the genetic commons. Part of the key to this success lies in the
structurally ambiguous status of small upstream firms. These small
firms not only provide large downstream firms with R&D inputs but also
threaten to integrate vertically downstream and enter the product
development, marketing, and distribution markets. A competitive
upstream market, coupled with a fairly concentrated downstream market,
encourages large firms to engage in innovative product development,
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allows small firms to bargain with downstream firms for competitively
priced distribution contracts, and maintains an open knowledge base for
university and small-firm entrants into the upstream market. By
contrast, a patent regime that lacks the threat of compulsory licensing
may allow large firms to integrate vertically upstream, acquire a patent
portfolio that erects insurmountable entry barriers to small firms, and
ultimately slows down the rate of fundamental innovation. This
unhappy result would reduce competitive conditions in the upstream

market, dampen incentives for incumbent firms to engage in
fundamental innovation, and close off much of the genetic commons to
biopharmaceutical scientist-entrepreneurs.
This Article has argued that the network model of innovative
development that characterizes the biotechnology sector relies closely on
the introduction of an imperfect regime of patent protection. This fact
may carry some general implications for understanding the primary
function of patent rights in stimulating private innovation in sciencebased industries. Incentive theories of patent rights focus on optimizing
the scope and duration of monopoly awards to cover the development
costs, and under some versions lost spillovers, that discourage private
investment in high-risk/high-spillover innovation projects. Applied to
the biopharmaceutical sector, these incentive-based theories would
recommend broadly defined prospect patents that cover a wide range of
subsequent improvements. The innovative vitality of the biotechnology
sector suggests, however, that policymakers sometimes should design
patent entitlements that provide incomplete coverage of the spillover
losses that private investors expect to incur in product development.
The availability of even an incomplete degree of patent protection for
fundamental innovation products allows entrepreneurially inclined
researchers and large-firm distributors to overcome the commitment
costs that may prevent the formation of mutually beneficial alliances. At
the same time, the incomplete coverage of these patent rights encourages
individual patent holders to form technology-sharing, or competencysharing, alliances that cover the appropriability shortfall and internalize
much of the expected spillovers from an innovation project.
These upstream-downstream, industry-industry, or university-industry
collaborative ventures form a network model of innovation that detours
around the tradeoff between productivity benefits and accessibility costs
that commentators generally associate with patent protection for
biopharmaceutical innovations. Each alliance operates as an individual
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network that allocates product development, distribution, and marketing

costs among small-firm and large-firm managers who exhibit contrasting
risk preferences, investment horizons, and organizational competencies.
In turn, each individual network operates as a node in a higher-order
innovation network, including biotechnology start-ups, multinational
pharmaceutical manufacturers, and university departments, that
transmits commercially promising units of the federally funded stock of
genetic information from the academic to the industrial sector. Subject
to antitrust monitoring of backward integration and patent consolidation
strategies, this innovation network is likely to enhance diffusion of the
genetic information base and accelerate the development of fundamental
therapeutic innovations.
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